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WORLD WAR I: "THE WAR TO END ALL
WARS"AND THE BIRTH OF A HANDICAPPED
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
"Strategy is a system of stop-gaps."
-Moltke'
INTRODUCTION
The words of Von Moltke, Germany's well-known general, are an apt prelude
to the strategy of justice pursued by the Allies after World War I. It was, indeed, a
"system of stop-gaps."
World War I, commonly referred to as the "Great War" and "the war to end
all wars," took place between 1914 and 1918 and "was the first general war,
involving all the Great Powers of the day, to be fought out in the modem,
industrialized world."2 The trigger for the war was an incident that occurred in the
volatile Balkans 3 on June 28, 1914, in which Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his
wife were assassinated by Gavrilo Princip as they rode in a car in Sarajevo.4 The
" Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of
Law; President, International Association of Penal Law; President, International Institute for Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences.
1. ERICH VON MANSTEIN, LOST VICTORIES 367 (1958). See Gunter E. Rothberg, Moltke,
Schlieffen & the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY FROM
MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 299 (Peter Paret ed., 1986).
Moltke believed that war, given its uncertainties and changing circumstances, was more
an art than a science. Consequently, there could be no "general rules" or "precepts."
Instead, strategy could be no more than a "system of expedience" based on the strength
of character and experience of the commander and his ability to make rapid decisions
under stress. [C]ommon sense and opportunity, based on the honing of personal
judgment were in fact his recipe for a commander's strategic decisions.
Id. See also EBERHARD KESSEL, MOLTKE (1957).
2. DAVID STEVENSON, THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (1988).
3. The First and Second Balkan Wars had just been fought in the region in 1912 and 1913. See
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 10 (1996) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, LAW OF THE ICTY] ("The two Balkan wars involved
ethnic conflict on a massive scale. The worst atrocities appear to be related to efforts to unite the
peninsula's Serbian population."). Cf M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian
Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 279 (1994).
4. JOHN KEEGAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 49 (1999).
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plot to assassinate the heir to the Hapsburg throne was planned by a secret Serbian
nationalist organization known as the Black Hand.5 Bosnia, which had been
annexed into the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908, was viewed by such
nationalist groups as an extension of Serbia.6 On July 28, 1914, following a
Hapsburg ultimatum and the Serbian government's refusal to allow Austro-
Hungarian representatives to participate in its official investigation of the
assassinations, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.7
What began as nothing more than a local Balkan conflict, however, soon
escalated into a continental one.8 Following Russia's general mobilization on July
30, 1914, and France's refusal to declare its neutrality in the event of a Russo-
German confrontation, Germany declared war on Russia and France on August I
and August 3, respectively. 9 Then, on August 4, 1914, Great Britain declared war
on Germany after the latter invaded Belgium.
10
The Allied and Associated Powers included the major powers of the Triple
Entente, namely: Russia; France; and Great Britain; as well as, Belgium; Serbia;
Japan; Italy; and numerous other nations. 1' The United States did not officially
enter the conflict until April 6, 1917, when it declared war on Germany and joined
the Allied and Associated Powers. 12  The Central Powers' alliance comprised
5. See id. ("[T]hough the terrorists were all Austrian subjects, they had been armed in Serbia and
smuggled back across the Austrian border by a Serbian nationalist organization."); STEVENSON, supra
note 2, at 11-12.
6. See KEEGAN, supra note 4, at 48-49; see also STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 12 ("After the
annexation a loosely organized group of secret societies, the Young Bosnians, turned to assassination as
a means of touching off a revolutionary movement that would attain their goal of an independent
federation uniting the South Slavs. From this milieu the Sarajevo conspirators came."). This was the
basis for Serb ultra-nationalists in 1992 to claim portions of Bosnia as being part of "Greater Serbia."
See BASSIOUNI, LAW OF THE ICTY, supra note 3, at 33, 37; see also MIsHA GLENNY, THE BALKANS:
NATIONALISM, WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1804-1999, at 635-36 (2000).
7. See KEEGAN, supra note 4, at 55-56, 58; STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 11. It is interesting to
note that if Serbia had pursued an effective and transparent investigation, World War I may not have
commenced. Thus, legal accountability could have prevented war.
8. See STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 11. Influences that helped to catapult this localized conflict
into a war of global proportions included antagonism between the great alliances of the Triple Eniente
and the Triple Alliance (weakened, in part, by Italy's secret defection), nationalism, an accelerated arms
race, economic rivalry between Britain and Germany, bitterness over the German annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and Russian designs on the Straits. See id. at 18-
22; HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
OF WAR GUILT 43-90 (Howard Fertig, Inc. 1970) (1926). See generally BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE
PROUD TOWER: A PORTRAIT OF THE WORLD BEFORE THE WAR, 1890-1914 (1966).
9. See STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 17-29. Germany's declaration of war on Russia was
particularly revealing of inter-European shifting alliances in view of Kaiser Wilhelm l's personal
friendship with Czar Nicholas 11. See CORRESPONDANCE ENTRE GUILLAUME II ET NICOLAS II: 1894-
1914 (1924) (revealing how close that the two leaders were, as they referred to each other as "Willy"
and "Nikki").
10. See STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 35.
11. See FRANCIS A. MARCH, HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR: AN AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE OF THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WAR 73-74 (1919). The other countries comprising the Allied and Associated
Powers were Brazil, China, Cost Rica, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia,
Montenegro, Nicaragua, Panama, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, and Siam. See id.
12. See MARCH, supra note II at 74; Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Austria-Hungary, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria. 13 In total, twenty-
eight countries entered the war.
14
The number of casualties from the war was unprecedented - totaling
33,434,443.5 The final tally of the dead was 7,781,806, in addition to 18,681,257
persons who were wounded, 16 and no one knows how many among the latter died
of their injuries or related illnesses. Russian, German, and French deaths due to
combat or disease were estimated at 4,696,404.17 World War I was the first time
that asphyxiating gas and mustard gas were utilized as weapons in warfare.
18
These chemical agents not only caused painful deaths and immediate illness, but
permanent injuries as well. 19 In time, many of the chemical agents' victims died of
their injuries or of health complications.20 In addition, there were many allegations
of atrocities being committed by combatants against civilians, including claims
that women and children had been used as human shields, mutilated, and
systematically executed.2'
After four years of brutal trench warfare characterized by the Napoleonic-era
strategy of massive frontal attacks,22 which caused so many senseless casualties,
Between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the People of the United States and
Making Provision to Prosecute the Same, Apr. 6, 1917, reprinted in JAMES BROWN SCOTT, A SURVEY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, AUGUST 1, 1914-
APRIL 6, 1917, at xxi-xxii (1917).
13. See MARCH, supra note 11, at 73-74.
14. Id. at 21. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
15. See MARCH, supra note 11, at 32.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 31-32.
18. KEEGAN, supra note 4, at 197-99.
19. See id. at 197, 199.
20. This led to the adoption in 1925 of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94
L.N.T.S. 65,26 U.S.T. 571.
21. See MARCH, supra note 11, at 97-98; cf JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 9-10 (1982). In
Annex I to its 1919 Report, the Allied Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on Enforcement of Penalties cited to the following examples of offenses alleged to have been
committed by the Central Powers: "A German infantry captain put three children round him to protect
him from Belgian fire;" "[f9requent tortures-before murder; tearing out eyes, cutting off nose and ears,
also breasts of women;" "[w]omen undressed and nailed to the ground;" and "[clivilians compelled to
march in front of Austro-Hungarian troops as a shield." 6 DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PAMPHLET NO. 32, VIOLATION OF THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF WAR: REPORTS OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING REPORTS OF AMERICAN AND
JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, CONFERENCE OF PARIS 32-33 (photo.
reprint 2000) (1919) [hereinafter VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR].
22. See KEEGAN, supra note 4, at 175-80, 182. Trench warfare in "no man's land" was dominated
by the British policy of "redigging trenches closer to the enemy's and staging frequent trench raids."
Id. at 182. As described by Sir John Keegan:
The first trench raid appears to have been mounted on the night of 9/10 November 1914
near Ypres by the 39th Garwhal Rifles of the Indian Corps. Fierce irruptions into enemy
positions under cover of darkness was a traditional feature of Indian frontier fighting and
this first murderous little action may have represented an introduction of tribal military
practice into the "civilised" warfare of western armies. The event set a precedent of
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the war finally ended on November 11, 1918, when a German delegation, led by
Secretary of State Matthias Erzberger, signed the armistice agreement on behalf of
Germany in an isolated railway car located in the Compi~gne Forest near Paris.
23
Unfortunately, rather than promoting lasting European stability, the harsh terms of
the armistice 24 and the Carthaginian peace dictated by the Allies at Versailles
sowed the seeds that brought about the Second World War two decades later.
25
Thus, the "war to end all wars" was a prelude to another war whose consequences
were even more devastating than the first one.
The Treaty of Versailles forced upon Germany draconian reparation
measures. For example, the treaty required Germany to cede to the Allies all of its
merchant ships over 1,600 tons, plus one-quarter of its fishing fleet;26 to deliver
huge quantities of coal to numerous Allied nations, as well as Benzol, coal tar, and
ammonium sulfate to France; 27 and, despite the existence of famine conditions in
which the British were to make a habit and which the Germans were to copy. The
French, despite their long experience of tribal warfare in North Africa, never found a
similar enthusiasm for these barbaric flurries of slash and stab. Id.
23. See 12 AMERICANIZATION DEP'T, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF U.S., AMERICA: GREAT
CRISES IN OUR HISTORY TOLD BY ITS MAKERS 158-65 (1925) [hereinafter AMERICA: GREAT CRISES].
After Germany defeated France in 1940, Adolph Hitler, in an act of symbolic irony, dictated armistice
terms to the French in the very same railroad car. DAVID IRVING, HITLER'S WAR 295 (1990). Hitler
retrieved the dining car from its permanent display in Paris and placed it in the identical location in the
Compitgne Forest in which it sat in 1918. Id.
24. See C. PAUL VINCENT, THE POLITICS OF HUNGER: THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF GERMANY,
1915-1919, at 162-65 (1985) (noting potential connection between armistice's continuation of Allied
hunger blockade of Germany and the rise of National Socialism).
25. See LEON DEGRELLE, HITLER: BORN AT VERSAILLES 532 (1987) ("The inequity of the
Versailles Peace Treaty created the exceptional circumstances that paved Hitler's road to power. All
the obstacles that would have stood in his way were swept away by the treaty. Hitler as a political man
was bom at Versailles."); KEEGAN, supra note 4, at 3 ("The Second World War, five times more
destructive of human life and incalculably more costly in material terms, was the direct outcome of the
First."); cf IRVING, supra note 23, at 234-35 ("[President Roosevelt] himself recognized that the real
reason for the war lay in the one-sided Diktat of Versailles which made it impossible for the German
people to acquire a living standard comparable with that of their neighbors in Europe.").
In fact, Hitler wrote publicly about the significance of the Treaty of Versailles for revitalizing Germany:
In 1919, when the Peace Treaty was imposed on the German nation, there were grounds
for hoping that this instrument of unrestricted oppression would help to reinforce the
outcry for the freedom of Germany. Peace treaties which make demands that fall like a
whip-lash on the people turn out not infrequently to be the signal of a future revival.
Each point of that Treaty could have been engraved on the minds and hearts of the
German people and burned into them until sixty million men and women would find
their souls aflame with a feeling of rage and shame; and a torrent of fire would burst
forth as from a furnace, and one common will would be forged from it, like a sword of
steel. Then the people would join in the common cry: "To arms again!"
ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 347-48 (James Murphy trans., photo. reprint n.d.) (1939).
26. See Degrelle, supra note 25, at 509; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND
AFTER: ANNOTATIONS OF THE TEXT OF THE TREATY 490-99 (photo. reprint, Greenwood Press 1968)
(1944) [hereinafter VERSAILLES AND AFTER] (reprinting and providing commentary on Annex Ill to
Part VIII of the Versailles Treaty).
27. See DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 511; VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 508-15
(reprinting and providing commentary on Annex V to Part VIII of the Versailles Treaty).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Germany, to provide the Allies with a substantial portion of its remaining
livestock.28 In addition, in April 1921, the Reparation Commission set the total
amount of damage on which reparations were due at 132 billion gold marks. 29 In
the assessment of Lenin, who was certainly no friend to Germany: "A peace of
usurers and executioners has been imposed on Germany. This country has been
plundered and dismembered . . .. All its means of survival were taken away. This
is an incredible bandits' peace. 30
Reparations and collective sanctions are fundamentally unfair. They punish
not only the innocent of the time, but also generations of innocents to come. Such
injustice breeds the call for revenge and can always be counted on to bring about
renewed conflict. Indeed, injustice is never conducive to peace. The economic
benefits that accrued to the Allies as a result of the Versailles Treaty produced dire
economic conditions in Germany and fed the hungry the desire for redress. This
led to the formation of the German National Socialist Labor Party, a labor-oriented
movement dedicated to combating the indignities forced upon Germany by the
treaty.3' It was that party under Hitler's leadership that brought about World War
II and all its related tragedies, the worst of which was the Jewish Holocaust.32
The Allies needed to personify the cause of this brutal and humanly costly
war to satisfy the masses' desire for revenge or justice, as the case may be. The
German Kaiser was easily identifiable as such a figure and was to be tried;
33
however, because of the blood relations between the German and English
monarchies, England's desire to prosecute the Kaiser, even though professed,
remains suspect. The government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, whose royal
28. See DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 511-12; VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 499-508
(reprinting and providing commentary on Annex IV to Part VIII of the Versailles Treaty).
29. See VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 433. The lessons are unfortunately seldom
remembered, and in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations Security Council, led by
the United States, imposed harsh economic sanctions on Iraq that in a decade destroyed its economy
and caused the death of an estimated 1 million children and elder persons due to lack of medicine and
food. There is no escaping the responsibility of these consequences, which can only be deemed
criminal. See IRAQ UNDER SIEGE: THE DEADLY IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AND WAR (Anthony Amove
ed., 2000).
30. DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 528.
31. See Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin, 39
AM. J. INT'L L. 518, 520 (1945) ("It is well known that the political responsibility for the Treaty of
Versailles was a main cause for the breakdown of the Weimar Republic and the rise of national
socialism."); supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also HITLER, supra note 25, at 193.
The reservoir from which the young movement has to draw its members will first of all
be the working masses. Those masses must be delivered from the clutches of the
international mania. Their social distress must be eliminated. They must be raised
above their present cultural level, which is deplorable, and transformed into a resolute
and valuable factor in the folk-community, inspired by national ideas and national
sentiment.
HITLER, supra note 25, at 193.
32. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law andthe Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 202
(1979).
33. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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family was also related to the Kaiser, gave him refuge after he abdicated.34 The
Allies' public opinion also demanded war crimes trials of the defeated Germans.
But the Allied governments' will to do so dissolved between 1919-1922 and the
desire to "let bygones be bygones," accompanied by the fear of internal revolution
due to fierce German opposition to war crimes trials, led the Allies to acquiesce in
Germany's request to conduct in 1923 only a limited number of trials before the
national Supreme Court at Leipzig.3 The experience was disastrous.
Lastly, Allied attempts to prosecute Turkish officials for the Armenian
massacres committed during World War I were aborted.36 This was due to
changing political circumstances in the region, particularly after the 1917 Russian
Revolution under Lenin's ruthless leadership and the establishment of what the
Allies called the Bolshevik Regime. This led the Allies to assuage the new
Turkish government and to avoid causing it embarrassment through prosecutions
for crimes against the Armenians, especially in light of Turkish claims that the
Armenians had sided with the "Bolsheviks" during the War.
PRELUDE TO PARIS
The Paris Peace Conference held its first plenary session on January 18,
1919.3 7 The purpose of the Conference was to effect peaceful settlements of the
disputes arising out of World War 1. 38 At the Conference the British Empire,
France, Italy, Japan, and the United States had five delegates each.39 Belgium,
Brazil, and Serbia had three delegates apiece. 40  Australia, Canada, China, the
Czecho-Slovak Republic, Greece, India, the Kingdom of the Hedjaz, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, and South Africa were each allotted two delegates. 4' The
countries of Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Montenegro, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, and Siam each had one delegate.42 The Conference
officially ended on January 21, 1920. 43 Numerous treaties were negotiated as a
result of the efforts of the Paris Peace Conference,44 the most influential being the
Treaty of Versailles with Germany. However, before examining the negotiations
that took place at the Paris Peace Conference in connection with war crimes
prosecutions, it is instructive to briefly describe the fervent political climate in
which such deliberations took place.
34. See infra notes 246-256 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 257-305 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 306-334 and accompanying text.
37. See F.S. MARSTON, THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919: ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE 235
(photo. reprint, Greenwood Press 1981) (1944).
38. See id. at 84.




43. See MARSTON, supra note 37, at 246.
44. See id. at 234-46.
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At the end of World War I, there was a great outcry from the Entente, and
especially from Great Britain, for the trial of Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern, Emperor
of Germany. 45 The factors that contributed to this demand to indict the Kaiser
included the general public's aversion to the horrors of a protracted war, the
success of newly developed wartime propaganda techniques, 46 and the desire of
Allied politicians to advance their public standing by acting on their wartime
pledges to bring to trial the Germans responsible for the war and those who
committed war crimes. 47 This led American Secretary of State Robert Lansing,
who served as chairman of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of
War and on Enforcement of Penalties established on January 25, 1919, during the
Paris Peace Conference, to argue that the Europeans' plan to place the Kaiser on
trial was nothing more than an exercise in political pandering.48
Nevertheless, the passion of the times pervaded deep into legal circles. For
example, one author, writing in 1919 on the subject of the Kaiser's status under
international law, stated: "The Germans, by their ferocious and bestial methods,
have acted in a manner without precedent in the conduct of this Society of Nations
for over three centuries. We are consequently entitled, in maintaining our rule of
law, to act without precedent under that law ... , ,49 The writer then proposed,
"[u]nder the extraordinary conditions of the problem" with the Kaiser,50 to ignore
the ex post facto principle nulla poena sine lege and to instead prescribe a penalty
that was not established prior to the war5 1 - in the words of this attorney, "the
45. It was none other than David Lloyd George, Britain's Prime Minister, who, towards the end of
the Great War, exclaimed, "Hang the [K]aiser!" DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 17. See also James
Brown Scott, The Trial of the Kaiser, in WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS: THE STORY OF THE
PEACE CONFERENCE, 1918-1919, at 231, 240 (Edward Mandell House & Charles Seymour eds., 1921)
("Mr. Lloyd George appeared to be bent on trying the kaiser.").
46. See DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 17 ("[W]ilhelm's reputation was effectively hanged by the
war propaganda of the day .... ") ("[Liarge numbers of people still believe the German emperor to have
been a particularly baneful species of ogre .... ); WILLIS, supra note 21, at 41 (describing film entitled
"The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin," which portrayed alleged German atrocities in Belgium).
British propaganda mills had devised horror stories to suit each country's population.
They were to be the cannon fodder, and they had to be convinced. For four years the
concoctions of the London propagandists would ceaselessly fill the ears of millions of
gullible people. In big headlines the press kept pouring out enormous lies about Belgian
Red Cross nurses being shot by Hun firing squads; it depicted little girls praying to the.
Virgin Mary to replace hands that had been savagely chopped off by barbaric Teutons.
DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 522. For an exposd of wartime propaganda tales, see ARTHUR
PONSONBY, FALSEHOOD IN WAR-TIME: CONTAINING AN ASSORTMENT OF LIES CIRCULATED
THROUGHOUT THE NATIONS DURING THE GREAT WAR (1928).
47. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 69.
48. See id. (noting that Lansing felt that "the scheme to try the kaiser was solely the result of
Lloyd George's election campaign").
49. R. Floyd Clarke, The Status of William Hohenzollern, Kaiser of Germany, Under International
Law, 53 Am. L. REV. 401, 414 (1919). It should be noted that many of the casualties occurring in the
war resulted from the archaic strategy of frontal attacks; however, it was much easier to simply blame
these casualties on German "militarism." See supra notes 22, 46 and accompanying text.
50. See Clarke, supra note 49, at 425.
51. See id. at 416-17.
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Kaiser must die.",5 2 "Th[is] penalty," the author added, "we are entitled to add by
reason of our victory. .. 5 Fortunately, other legal scholars of the period
addressed the question of the legal propriety of trying the Kaiser with cooler heads
and more rational legal arguments.
5 4
In early January 1919, leaders of the Allies met to determine an outline for the
upcoming peace conference.55 At that meeting, Lloyd George, Prime Minister of
Great Britain, suggested that a special commission be established to consider
questions pertaining to the responsibilities for the causes of the war.5 6 President
Wilson responded that a committee was unnecessary because the leaders
themselves could resolve such a problem.5 7  Wilson apparently had in mind the
realistic prospect of exiling the Kaiser in the same manner that Napoleon had been
banished to St. Helena almost a century before.5 8 Lloyd George, however, failed to
follow Wilson's lead and insisted on the committee approach.5 9 James Willis, in
his leading study on the subject, described this decision as "Lloyd George's single
most important error. ' 60
By insisting on a commission, Lloyd George unleashed a process that, due to
bitter disputes between the Allies, not only disinclined the Dutch to cooperate with
52. Clarke, supra note 49, at 415.
53. Id. at 417.
54. See, e.g., James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War,
14 Am. J. INT'L L. 70 (1920); Quincy Wright, The Legal Liability of the Kaiser, 13 AM. POL. Sc. REV.
120 (1919).
55. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 68. It was very unusual to hold a pre-conference meeting;
likewise, it was peculiar to have the conference's investigative commission issue its decision prior to
the signing of the peace treaty. In addition, such proceedings were conducted without all parties being
present, were directed specifically against the Germans, and, like Nuremberg, represented the viewpoint
of only one side of the conflict.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. Cf L.C. Green, Enforcement of the Law in International and Non-International
Conflicts-The Way Ahead, 24 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 285,302-03 (1996).
As early as 1815 it was suggested that Napoleon should be brought to trial for having
violated the 1814 agreement exiling him to Elba. After his escape and return to France
where he again raised an army, he was declared by the Congress of Vienna "to have
destroyed the sole legal title upon which his existence depended ... placed himself
outside the protection of the law, and manifested to the world that it can neither have
peace nor truce with him ... [and placed himself] outside the civil and social relations,
[so] that, as Enemy and Pertubator of the World, he has incurred liability to public
vengeance."
While Blticher would have had him shot as an "outlaw," Napoleon was regarded "by the Powers as
their Prisoner" and placed in the custody of the British who exiled him to St. Helena. Green, supra
(quoting 2 JAMES GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 438-39 (1920)).
59. See ARTHUR WALWORTH, WILSON AND His PEACEMAKERS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT THE
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919, at 214 (1986).
At Paris, Wilson suggested that the question of national and individual crimes against
decency be settled in the comparative privacy of the Supreme Council; but when Lloyd
George brought up the matter in that body for a second time, it was decided to place the
subject on the agenda of a plenary session. As a result the Peace Conference decided ...
to create a commission to study the question. Id.
60. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 68.
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the victorious powers, 61  but ultimately sounded the death knell for the
establishment of an international tribunal to try the Kaiser. Although Lloyd
George may simply have been seeking to set new international precedent with
respect to aggressive warfare,62 the referral of significant issues of political import
to committees, which can be mired in endless discussions and fail to reach
effective and timely decisions, often evidences realpolitik at its finest.63 Such a
subterfuge permits realpoliticians to publicly announce their purported goals of
justice while in fact burying them in a bureaucratic maze from which they will
never emerge or emerge as otherwise intended.64
The continuous clamor in the French, Belgian, and British press for war
crimes prosecutions65 represented the rise in influence of modern world public
opinion-similar to the present-day international civil society clamoring for
accountability for international crimes.66 The demand for war trials following the
First World War, therefore, constituted a mixture, rather than a convergence, of
domestic political pressures for accountability and the realization of the political
goals of the Allied governments. Thus, while the war crimes issue was utilized to
satisfy popular opinion in France, Belgium, and Britain, it was also used by the
Allied governments to extract exorbitant reparations from Germany.67
As with any conflict, its end brings about a feeling of relief which, after the
original impulse for accountability, historically asserted by the victors against the
defeated, is followed by a certain lassitude. This weariness, which may well be the
product of a socio-psychological condition arising out of war's trauma, leads to the
desire to forget the pain and to move beyond the events that brought about these
feelings. Governments, however, tend to view such matters from the perspective
of state interests and, more often than not, use the public's desire to
psychologically "move on," or the sense of lassitude that sets in after the heat of
passion following war has abated, to manipulate justice for political ends.68
61. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 68..
62. Cf. id.
63. The use of multiple committees, different mandates, different venues, and divergent schedules
serve to dilute public opinion, erode focus, and cause people to forget the significance of the issue at
hand. In addition, by making the process very costly, realpoliticians can justify the eventual cessation
of the committee process and thereby derail any final resolution.
64. It was Field Marshal Von Bluicher, the aged Prussian commander whose timely arrival at the
Battle of Waterloo led to Napoleon's defeat, who stated, following the famous battle, "May the pens of
the diplomats not ruin again what the people have attained with such exertions." JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 469 (14th ed. 1968) (quoting Gebhard Leberecht von Blicher).
65. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 141-42.
66. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Need for International Accountability, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 3, 3-30 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Bassiouni, The Need for
International Accountability]; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71
U. COLO. L. REV. 409 (2000) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Combating Impunity].
67. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 127, 141-43.
68. See, e.g., Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 66, at 409-11; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International
Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 17-21 (1997) [hereinafter Bassiouni, From Versailles to
Rwanda].
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ALLIED COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND
ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES
On January 25, 1919, exactly one week after the formal opening of the
Preliminary Peace Conference at Paris, the Allied and Associated Powers
appointed a commission to inquire into the causes and responsibilities for the
recently concluded war.69  The rapid establishment of the commission was in
harmony with the demands of Britain's Lloyd George and French Premier Georges
Clemenceau that the subject of war crimes be given first priority at the Peace
Conference, 70 thus evidencing the rise of the value of justice in the context of post-
conflict settlements.
This commission, which was the first modem international investigative body
of its kind,7 was named the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of
the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (Commission).72 It was composed of
fifteen members, including two members from each of the respective Great
Powers, the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, and one member from
each of the following countries: Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia.73
The Commission met in secret for two months before issuing its final report.
74
The mandate presented to the Commission sought inquiry into the following
areas: (1) the responsibility for the causes of the war; (2) the facts relating to
violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the Central Powers; (3)
the degree of responsibility that should attach to individual members of the enemy
forces, "however highly placed;" and (4) the constitution and procedure for a
69. VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at v. The Report Presented
to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties, March 29, 1919 [hereinafter 1919 Commission Report], is
reprinted at pages 4-27 of VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21. The
Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of
the Commission on Responsibilities, April 4, 1919 [hereinafter U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919] is
included as Annex 11 to the 1919 Commission Report and is reprinted at pages 58-79 of VIOLATION OF
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21. The Reservations by the Japanese Delegation, April
4, 1919 [hereinafter Japanese Dissenting Report, 1919], are included as Annex III to the 1919
Commission Report and are reprinted at pages 79-80 of VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
WAR, supra note 21.
70. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 68.
71. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 14. The commission was
established five months prior to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. However, in 1474, Peter von
Hagenbach was put on trial and convicted by an ad hoc tribunal for crimes against the citizens of
Breisach. See 2 GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 462-66 (1968). The Breisach
trial has been described as "the forerunner of contemporary international war crimes trials." 2 id. at
462.
72. See VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 1.
73. See id The Commission was composed of the following representatives: United States of
America-Robert Lansing, James Brown Scott; British Empire-Gordon Hewart or Ernest Pollock,
W.F. Massey; France-Andrd Tardieu, F. Lamaude; Italy-Mr. Scialoja, Mr. Raimondo (later Mr.
Brambilla and Mr. M. d'Amelio); Japan-Mr. Adatci, Mr. Nagaoka (later Mr. Tachi); Belgium-Mr.
Rolin-Jaequemyns; Greece-Mr. N. Politis; Poland-Mr. C. Skirmunt (later Mr. N. Lubienski);
Roumania-Mr. S. Rosental; and Serbia--Slobodan Yovanovitch. Id. at 1-2.
74. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 68.
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tribunal to try such offenses.75  Following some highly incendiary ideological
clashes during the preliminary deliberations, the Commission divided up into three
sub-commissions, which dealt respectively with the questions of war crimes, the
legal ramifications of war guilt, and the prospects for prosecution before a
tribunal.76
On March 29, 1919, the Commission formally submitted its Report Presented
to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Report).77  The Report presented
conclusions regarding the authorship of the war, the personal responsibility of the
Kaiser, war crimes, violations of the "laws of humanity," and the establishment of
a High Tribunal to try offenses committed by the Central Powers.78
On April 4, 1919, the American delegation to the Commission, which
consisted of Robert Lansing and Dr. James Brown Scott, an eminent scholar in
international law, submitted its Memorandum of Reservations (Memorandum) in
response to the Commission's Report.79 By means of this Memorandum, the
United States, whether on account of political or legal reasons, 80 effectively
75. VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 1.
76. See id. at 2-3; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 69-74.
77. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 4-27. The Commission's Report was 27 pages in length and
contained four annexes. In preparing its extensive Summary of Examples of Offences committed by
the Central Powers, the Commission relied upon official Allied government publications and
memoranda, as well as upon reports issued by commissions of enquiry from various Allied nations. See
Summary of Examples of Offences Committed by the Authorities or Forces of the Central Empires and
their Allies Against the Laws and Customs of War and the Laws of Humanity, in 1919 Commission
Report, supra note 69, Annex I [hereinafter Summary of Examples], reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 28-57.
78. Infra notes 86-150 and accompanying text.
79. See U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 58-79.
80. See KLAUS SCHWABE, WOODROW WILSON, REVOLUTIONARY GERMANY, AND
PEACEMAKING, 1918-1919: MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY AND THE REALITIES OF POWER 248-49 (Rita
Kimber and Robert Kimber trans., 1985) ("Wilson's reasons for differing so markedly from his
Associates in th[e] question [of the Kaiser's trial] were not only legal but political as well.") ("The
moderate line which the Americans took in the Commission on Responsibility clearly reflected
Wilson's desire for a peace which would be both liberal and at the same time unassailable in terms of
international law."); WILLIS, supra note 21, at 77 ("The conclusion is inescapable that disagreement
about a trial of Wilhelm II resulted as much from political as from legal differences.").
The United States was subject to the presence of isolationists, whose ideology ultimately
succeeded. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 20 ("[Tjhe United States was
in the throes of isolationism, with its rejection of President Woodrow Wilson's internationalist views,
evidenced by Congress' refusal to have the United States become part of the League of Nations.").
Although the Americans would have, as a matter ofjustice, agreed with the result sought by
the Commission, their state policy was directly contrary to such an outcome. In fact, the position taken
by the American delegation following World War I, which is analogous to that presently being asserted
by the United States with respect to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). See
James L. Taulbee, A Call to Arms Declined: The United States and the International Criminal Court, 14
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105, 124-54 (2000); Cheryl K. Moralez, Establishing an International Criminal
Court: Will it Work?, 4 DEPAUL INT'L L.J. 135, 147-64 (2000) (describing the United States' position
regarding the Rome Treaty); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter ICC Statute], reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
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undermined the Europeans' plan to try the Kaiser, to recognize crimes against "the
laws of humanity" as a basis for the prosecution of Turkish officials, and to
establish an international criminal court. 81 Robert Lansing deliberately employed
every available tactic to frustrate the aims of the Europeans during both
Commission and subcommittee meetings;8 2 moreover, according to Lansing,
President Woodrow Wilson "approved entirely of my attitude, only he is even
more radically opposed than I am to th[e] folly [of trying the Kaiser]. 83
In addition to the Memorandum submitted by the Americans, the Japanese
delegation to the Commission likewise tendered its own Reservations on April 4,
1919.84 Specifically, the Japanese challenged the propriety of the overall concept
of victor's justice, stating: "A question may be raised whether it can be admitted as
a principle of the law of nations that a High Tribunal constituted by belligerents
can, after a war is over, try an individual belonging to the opposite side ....""
As discussed below, the American-Japanese position foreclosed the
opportunity of prosecuting Turkish officials and would have done the same for the
Kaiser's prosecution, except that the Netherlands' act of granting him refuge
solved that problem. In the end, the only two questions left were those of war
crimes prosecutions and setting up an international tribunal to do so. The result
was the failure of both efforts, as set forth below.
A. Responsibility of the Authors of the War
With respect to the authorship of the war, the Commission hastily concluded,
in what would become "the most controversial legacy of the peace conference,,
86
that the responsibility for the Great War rested "first on Germany and Austria,
secondly on Turkey and Bulgaria., 87 The Commission further determined that
Germany, in concert with Austria-Hungary, "deliberately worked to defeat all the
many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts
to avoid war." 8 Not only were the Commission's conclusions unjustified by the
available evidence, 89 but they serve as an excellent example of the undesirability of
having such momentous questions, best left to historians, decided by an
investigative panel composed entirely of the victors.
81. Infra note 342 and accompanying text.
82. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 69-70, 73-75, 76-77.
83. Id. at 70.
84. See Japanese Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 79-80.
85. Id., reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 80.
86. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 72.
87. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 4.
88. id., reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 11.
89. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 72 ("[T1he evidence available to the subcommittee did not
justify its strong conclusions."); see DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 521 ("There is not a serious historian
today who would dare attribute the sole guilt for World War I to Germany.").
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The question of responsibility, of course, was not predicated on the pursuit of
international criminal accountability or the pursuit of international justice. Rather,
such a determination represented an attempt to justify harsh provisions on
reparations. In this way, the Allies established a necessary legal bridge between
the responsibility for the war and reparations, which, due to their severity, were
quasi-penal in nature. 9° The eventual trial of the Kaiser was the frosting on the
cake. But because there existed no legal basis for state criminal responsibility, 91
the Allies were hard pressed to justify the reparations under existing international
law. Articles 227 to 230 of the Versailles Treaty addressed only individual
criminal responsibility, 92 though Article 227, which addressed the criminal
responsibility of the Kaiser for waging a war of aggression, as it would now be
called, did not exist at the time in international criminal law.93 Compensation,
however, as recognized under international law principles of state responsibility,
extended to actual damages, but it was questionable whether it included, under the
circumstances, such punitive damages.94 There was no principle in international
law that satisfied the goals of the Allies.
Interestingly, the Commission's declaration of Germany's responsibility for
the war did not constitute the basis for the controversial war-guilt clause, Article
231, 95 contained in the Treaty of Versailles.96  Because this clause followed
immediately after Articles 228 to 230, the war crimes clauses, the Germans
assumed that Article 231 was based upon the Commission's Report.97 Article 231,
however, actually stemmed from a compromise in the Commission on Reparation
of Damage.9i
90. Cf Fritz Munch, State Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 143, 152 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973) ("The
Peace Treaties of 1919/1920 stipulated a responsibility for damages caused by the war, but war was not
considered a delinquency at that time, and the articles in question read rather like political motivations
for the constitution of a debt.").
91. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A
Theoretical Framework, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 28-29 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2d ed.
1999); Munch, supra note 90, at 148; John Dugard, Criminal Responsibility of States, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 239, 239 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
92. See Munch, supra note 90, at 148.
93. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 26.
94. See Munch, supra note 90, at 151-53.
95. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of
Versailles), June 28, 1919, art. 231, 2 BEVANs 43, 137-38 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]. Article
231 states:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility
of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and
Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the
war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. Id.
96. See Willis, supra note 21, at 72 ("The Allies did not include [the Commission's] accusation in
the peace treaty.").
97. See id.
98. See id.; SCHWABE, supra note 80, at 289; MARC TRACHTENBERG, REPARATION IN WORLD
POLITICS: FRANCE AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, 1916-1923, at 56-57 (1980). Article 231 is
contained in Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, which is entitled "REPARATION"; in contrast, the
"Kaiser clause," Article 227, and the war crimes clauses, Articles 228 to 230, are contained in Part VII
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B. The Personal Criminal Responsibility of the Kaiser
After finding that the Central Powers and their allies had conducted the war
"by barbarous or illegitimate methods,"99 the Commission declared that all guilty
persons from the enemy nations, including heads of state, were individually liable
for such war crimes and, therefore, were subject to criminal prosecution: lOO
[T]here is no reason why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances
protect the holder of it from responsibility when that responsibility has been
established before a properly constituted tribunal. This extends even to the case of
Heads of States. An argument has been raised to the contrary based upon the
alleged immunity, and in particular the alleged inviolability, of a Sovereign of a
State ... However, even if, in some countries, a Sovereign is exempt from being
prosecuted in a national court of his own country the position from an
international point of view is quite different. '
01
The Commission fiuther remarked that a bar against prosecuting heads of
state who were guilty of war crimes and violations of the laws of humanity "would
shock the conscience of the civilized world."'
10 2
Concerning those individuals responsible for causing the outbreak of the war,
the Commission concluded that such persons, most notably the former Kaiser,
should not be subjected to criminal charges in front of a tribunal for breaching the
peace. 10 3 The Commission proclaimed that any member of the Central Powers
of the Treaty, which is entitled "PENALTIES." See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 95, arts. 227-230,
231, at 136-38. For a discussion of the origins of Article 231, see infra notes 205-215 and
accompanying text.
99. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 19.
100. See id. at 20.
101. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 20. The announcement of such a principle of individual criminal responsibility for heads
of state was unprecedented. Admittedly, a head of state could be found politically responsible and, as
in the case of Napoleon, punished by removal from power and by exile. But this new concept was a
throwback to earlier times when the defeated head of state was subjected to death or torture, though
irrespective of any wrongful conduct. Most contemporary writers erroneously focus on Article 7 of the
Nuremberg Charter, by which the Allies refused to recognize the defendants' official positions as
"freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment," as the first time in history that the
immunity of heads of state was removed. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945,
art. 7, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288, 59 Stat. 1546, 1548 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter], annexed to
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug.
8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544. The ICC Statute provides for it in Article 27(1):
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of
a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
ICC Statute, supra note 80, art. 27(1), reprinted in 37 1.L.M. 999, 1017 (1998).
103. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 23. The debate concemingjus ad bellum had
gone through a long historical evolution, mostly influenced by the arguments of canonist writers on the
differences between just and unjust wars; however, no resolution was reached. See Remigiusz
Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 87, 87-88 (M.
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who violated the laws and customs of war or the "laws or humanity," whatever his
rank or position, should be subject to trial.'1 4
In its Memorandum, the United States took issue with the Commission's
conclusions on a number of critical points. First of all, the Americans objected to
the concept of placing a chief of state on trial:
But the law to which the head of State is responsible is the law of his country, not
the law of a foreign country or group of countries; the tribunal to which he is
responsible is the tribunal of his country, not of a foreign country or group of
countries, and the punishment to be inflicted is the punishment prescribed by the
law in force at the time of the commission of the act, not a punishment created
after the commission of the act. 105
The British, however, opined that the Americans were afraid "to create the




Similarly, the American delegation, as well as the Japanese delegation,
10 7
refused to assent to the Commission's adoption of the doctrine of "negative
criminality."'' 08 "It was frankly stated that the [Commission's] purpose was to
bring before this [international] tribunal the ex-Kaiser of Germany, and that the
jurisdiction of the tribunals must be broad enough to include him even if he had
not directly ordered the violations."' 0 9
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR:
CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 40,42-44 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).
Following World War II, the Allies tried the leading members of the Axis at Nuremberg for
crimes against peace, which the Charter of the International Military Tribunal defined as "planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression." Nuremberg Charter, supra note 102, art. 6(a),
82 U.N.T.S. at 288, 59 Stat. at 1547. Yet, there was nothing in positive law at the time upon which to
predicate such a charge. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 26 ("Prosecution
for 'crimes against peace' was without legal precedent .... "). Presently, there is no convention
defining aggression. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Crime Against Peace, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 313, 334 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999). On the other hand,
the ICC, although it did not define aggression, does include the crime within its jurisdiction. Id. at 346;
see ICC Statute, supra note 80, art. 5, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1003-04 (1998).
104. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 23-24.
105. U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 66.
106. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 77. A position that seems to prevail in connection with the ICC.
See Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court, FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 20, 22, 23.
107. See Japanese Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 80.
108. Id. (footnotes omitted). See also llias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior
Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 573, 573 (1999).
Despite United States and Japanese dissent, the latter arguing that high-ranking officials could
not be held personally accountable under international law in accordance with the abstention theory of
responsibility, trials instituted at the German Supreme Court in Leipzig recognized the existence of
concrete duties pertaining to military commanders. Undoubtedly, two precursors to the Leipzig
proceedings, the Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) created affirmative command duties in
relation to the conduct of subordinate persons, establishing the doctrine of "command responsibility."
109. U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 60. Since then, the doctrine of command
responsibility has been well established in international criminal law. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 439 (2d rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter
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In this regard, until its final revision, the majority Report proposed that a High
Tribunal was the appropriate forum in which to try charges against all enemy
authorities, military or civil, including chiefs of state, who "abstained from
preventing, putting an end to, or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of
war."'"10 The United States expressed its opposition to this formulation of criminal
responsibility as follows:
It is one thing to punish a person who committed, or, possessing the authority,
ordered others to commit an act constituting a crime; it is quite another thing to
punish a person who failed to prevent, to put an end to, or to repress violations of
the laws or customs of war. In one case the individual acts or orders others to act,
and in so doing commits a positive offence. In the other he is to be punished for
the acts of others without proof being given that he knew of the commission of the
acts in question or that, knowing them, he could have prevented their
commission.
Ironically, it was this very concept of command responsibility" 2 that the
United States selectively employed after World War II in convicting and executing
General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the former commander of the Japanese armed
forces in the Philippines."
3
The American representatives, however, were in agreement with the
Commission's recommendation that no criminal charges could be brought based
upon acts that provoked the war, including breaches of neutrality alleged against
the Kaiser;" l4 yet, this position changed drastically with the advent of World War
II.115 As a matter of fact, it was then the United States that took the lead in
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY]; see L.C. Green, Superior Orders and Command
Responsibility, 27 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 167 (1989).
110. U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 72.
111. Id. at 72.
112. A failure to act to prevent unlawful conduct may provide the basis for imposition of criminal
responsibility under the doctrine of command responsibility. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY,
supra note 109, at 19. To effectively further the goal of deterrence, however, a showing of actual intent
is required. Id. at 423.
No one can be deterred from conduct beyond the control of the person whose
responsibility may be called into question. To hold a superior accountable on the basis
of omission for the conduct of a subordinate, therefore, requires intent or knowledge that
the omission can actually or reasonably and foreseeably lead to a violative act and that
the superior is in a position or has the ability to act in the prevention of the violative act.
Id.
113. In spite of General Yamashita's assertion that he neither ordered nor committed any of the
atrocities perpetrated by his troops, the United States Supreme Court held that he had "an affirmative
duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect
prisoners of war and the civilian population." In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I, 16 (1946). See also
RICHARD LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (1982);
A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA (1949).
114. See U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 67.
115. The United States could have justified a change in position by claiming that the inclusion of
Article 227 in the Versailles Treaty reflected an emerging custom that had ripened by the time World
War II ended. But then, the United States has never been known for legal and diplomatic subtleties.
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establishing "crimes against peace" as an international crime 1 6 under the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters." I7 The United States did not employ the concept
of a head of state's personal criminal responsibility against Japan's Emperor
Hirohito."'
Significantly, while arguing for the inclusion of crimes against peace at the
International Conference on Military Trials in London, Robert H. Jackson, the
American representative, pointed out that "sentiment in the United States and the
better world opinion have greatly changed since Mr. James Brown Scott and
Secretary Lansing announced their views as to criminal responsibility for the first
World War .... I don't think we can take the 1918 view on matters of war and
peace."" 9 Justice Jackson, however, conveniently omitted reference to the more
explicit views of Lansing and Scott, acting on behalf of the United States,
regarding crimes against the laws of humanity. 120 Thus, although the Commission
was against prosecuting the Kaiser for initiating the war, the drafters of the
Versailles Treaty took the opposite position. 121
C. War Crimes
As a means of classifying violations of "the laws and customs of war," the
Commission prepared the following categorical listing: 1
22
(1) Murders and massacres; systematic terrorism.
(2) Putting hostages to death.
(3) Torture of civilians.
(4) Deliberate starvation of civilians.
(5) Rape.
(6) Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution.
(7) Deportation of civilians.
(8) Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
(9) Forced labour of civilians in connection with the military operations of
the enemy.
116. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 174; Bassiouni & Ferencz, supra note 103, at 319.
117. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 102, art. 6(a), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288, 59 Stat. at 1547; Charter
for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved Apr. 26, 1946, art. 5(a), T.I.A.S. No.
1589, 4 BEVANS 27, 28 [hereinafter IMTFE Amended Charter].
118. RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 110-17 (1971); see
also JAMES WEBB, THE EMPEROR'S GENERAL (1999).
119. Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3080,
REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, LONDON, 1945, at 299 (1949).
120. See infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 159-193 and accompanying text.
122. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 34-35 (1948) [hereinafter
UNWCC].
VOL. 30:3
WWI: THE WAR TO END ALL WARS
(10) Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.
(11) Compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occupied
territory.
(12) Attempts to denationalise the inhabitants of occupied territory.
(13) Pillage.
(14) Confiscation of property.
(15) Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and requisitions.
(16) Debasement of the currency, and issue of spurious currency.
(17) Imposition of collective penalties.
(18) Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
(19) Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
(20) Wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational, and historic
buildings and monuments.
(21) Destruction of merchant ships and passenger vessels without warning
and without provision for the safety of passengers or crew.
(22) Destruction of fishing boats and of relief ships.
(23) Deliberate bombardment of hospitals.
(24) Attack on and destruction of hospital ships.
(25) Breach of other rules relating to the Red Cross.
(26) Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
(27) Use of explosive or expanding bullets, and other inhuman appliances.
(28) Directions to give no quarter.
(29) Ill-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war.
(30) Employment of prisoners of war on unauthorised works.
(31) Misuse of flags of truce.
(32) Poisoning of wells. 1
23
The violations catalogued by the Commission fell within the meaning of war
crimes under law and custom and the 1907 Hague Convention;124 yet, the
Commission also cited to examples of violations of the "laws of humanity,"125
which did not fall under the same legal norms.
In addition, the Commission stated that "civil and military authorities cannot
be relieved from responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have
129. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 17-18.
130. See UNWCC, supra note 122, at 35; see also Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 BEVANS 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague
Convention].
131. See UNWCC, supra note 122, at 35; see also infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
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been convicted of the same offense."' 12 6  In so doing, the Commission was
attempting to limit the defense of obedience to superior orders; otherwise, in the
telling words of the Report, "the trial of the offenders might be seriously
prejudiced."'
127
D. Crimes Against the "Laws of Humanity"; Prosecuting Turkish Officials
In an Annex to its 1919 Report, the Commission, under the category of
"Murders and Massacres: Systematic Terrorism," made specific reference to the
"Massacres of Armenians by the Turks."' 128  More specifically, the Commission
made the following notation: "More than 200,000 victims assassinated, burned
alive, or drowned in the lake of Van, the Euphrates or the Black Sea."' 29 This
finding was in harmony with the Triple Entente's earlier May 24, 1915,
Declaration condemning the Armenian massacres as "crimes against humanity and
civilisation" and promising retribution. 3 0
The Commission also recommended the establishment of a High Tribunal to
try the enemy offenders. 131  The Tribunal was to be composed of persons
appointed by the Allied and Associated Powers and was to set its own
procedures. 132 Significantly, the law to be applied by the High Tribunal was to
consist of "'the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages
established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the
132. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 20.
133. Id. at 20. As stated in note 102, most contemporary authors erroneously attribute to the
Nuremberg and IMTFE Charters, articles 8 and 6, respectively, the originality of limiting the defense of
obedience to superior orders. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 102, art. 8, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288, 59
Stat. at 1548; IMTFE Amended Charter, supra note 117, art. 6, 4 BEVANS at 28; see also NICO KEuZER,
MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978); LESLIE C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-242 (1976); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENSE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR
ORDERS" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-20 (1965); EKKEHART MOLLER-RAPPARD, L'ORDRE SUPERIEUR
MILITAIRE ET LA RESPONSIBILITE DU SUBORDONNt 185-251 (1965).
134. Summary of Examples, supra note 77, at 28, 30.
135. Id. at 30. It has now been estimated that more than one million Armenians were exterminated:
During World War 1, as the rest of the world looked on, the Ottoman Empire carried out
one of the largest genocides in the world's history, slaughtering huge portions of its
minority Armenian population. The Armenian genocide followed decades of
persecution by the Ottomans and came only after two similar but smaller round of
massacres in the 1894-96 and 1909 periods had resulted in two hundred thousand
Armenians deaths. In all, over one million Armenians were put to death.
Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I
Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221, 223 (1989)
[hereinafter Dadrian, Genocide].
136. Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 262 & n.129; UNWCC, supra note 122, at 35-36 ("The
warning thus given to the Turkish Government on that occasion by the Triple Entente dealt precisely
with one of the types of acts which the modem term 'crimes against humanity' is intended to cover,
namely, inhumane acts committed by a government against its own subjects."). See Bassiouni, The
Need for International Accountability, supra note 66, at 3-4 (noting that the number of victims always
increases in time).
137. See 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 24-25.
138. See id.
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dictates of public conscience."", 133  This language was taken directly from the
concluding paragraph of the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention.
134
The 1907 Hague Convention endeavored to set forth the general laws and
customs of war, but due to a lack of specificity, failed to encompass all conduct
that qualified as war crimes. In an effort to address this shortcoming, the drafters
inserted the following language in the Preamble:
It has not, however, been found possible at present to concert Regulations
covering all the circumstances which arise in practice;
On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that
unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the
arbitrary judgment of military commanders.
Until a more complete code of laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates
of the public conscience.135
This language became known as the Martens Clause, so named for Fyodor
Martens, the Russian diplomat who penned it. 136 Thus, customary international
law did establish a basis for individual war crimes prosecutions as envisioned by
the Commission. 37
The inclusion of this particular wording in the Commission's Report was
designed to enable the Allies to prosecute leading members of the Ittihad party,
commonly known as the Young Turks, who were believed to be responsible for the
massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians perpetrated under the guise of
wartime deportations. 138  Because the Commission's mandate was technically
restricted to violations of the laws and customs of war, the Commission invoked
the Martens Clause in the hopes of expanding the Tribunal's ability to prosecute
139. 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 24.
140. See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
141. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 124, preamble, 36 Stat. at 2279-80, 1 BEVANS at 632-33.
142. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 109, at 60 & n.81.
143. See id. at 71. On the other hand, violations attributable to the state resulted only in a "civil"
responsibility. See Munch, supra note 90, at 153; Dugard, supra note 91, at 239 ("[T]he only remedy
for a wrong committed by a state was reparation of the kind associated with compensation in civil,
delictual claims.").
144. See Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 252, 272-77, 279-81. See also Vahakn N. Dadrian,
Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in Turkish Sources, in 2 GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 86 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1991). See generally VAHAKN N. DADRIAN, THE
HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: ETHNIC CONFLICT FROM THE BALKANS TO ANATOLIA TO THE
CAUCASUS (1995) [hereinafter DADRIAN, HISTORY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE] (tracing religious and
cultural roots of Turkish-Armenian conflict).
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Turkish officials for acts committed against their own nationals 139 that are now
recognized as "crimes against humanity."
1 40
The Americans, however, vigorously protested the Commission's attempt to
assign criminal responsibility on the basis of violations of the "laws of humanity."
As a technical matter, the United States asserted that the Commission had gone
beyond the express terms of its mandate, which was restricted to violations of the
laws and customs of war.' 4 1  As a theoretical matter, the American delegation
argued that "the laws and principles of humanity are not certain, varying with time,
place, and circumstance, and according, it may be, to the conscience of the
individual judge. There is no fixed and universal standard of humanity.'
' 42
Because such considerations "vary with the individual," the Memorandum
concluded that they should not be within the province of criminal law. 1
43
In addition, the Americans objected at length to the creation of an
international criminal court "for which there is no precedent, precept, practice, or
procedure," and, instead, proposed the use of military commissions or tribunals.1
44
Relying upon the seminal decision of United States v. Hudson,145 in which the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to upholding the
principles of legality, namely, that there can be no crime without a law (nullum
crimen sine lege) and no punishment without a law (nulla poena sine lege), 146 the
delegates declared:
145. See Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 91 ("[T]he Commission also took note of the atrocities
committed on the territory of the Central Powers against their own nationals such as the massacres of
the Armenian population perpetrated by the Turkish authorities .... ); Bassiouni, From Versailles to
Rwanda, supra note 68, at 16-17; Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 279-81. As explained by
Willis:
To assure prosecution of such atrocities as the Armenian massacres and other outrages
not clearly prohibited by the laws of war, the Europeans, anticipating the idea of crimes
against humanity and genocide, wanted reference to the laws of humanity that were
mentioned in the preamble to the Hague convention of 1907 as supplementing the laws
of war.
WILLIS, supra note 21, at 75.
146. "Crimes against humanity" represent a jurisdictional extension from war crimes:
The essential difference between acts deemed war crimes and those deemed
"crimes against humanity" is that the former acts are committed in time of war
against nationals of another state, while the latter acts are committed against
nationals of the same state as that of the perpetrators. Thus, the [Nuremberg]
Charter took a step forward in the form of a jurisdictional extension when it
provided that the victims of the same types of conduct which constitutes war
crimes, were protected without the requirement that they be of a different
nationality than that of the perpetrators.
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 109, at 72.
147. See U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 73.
148. Id. at 73.
149. Id. at 64.
150. Id. at 70-71.
151. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
152. See id. at 34 ("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.").
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What is true of the American States must be true of this looser union which we
call the Society of Nations. The American representatives know of no
international statute or convention making a violation of the laws and customs of
war-not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity-an international crime,
affixing apunishment to it, and declaring the court which has jurisdiction over the
offence. IV
In sum, the Americans asserted that the establishment of an international
criminal tribunal that applied new laws and new penalties would be directly
contrary to the United States Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto
laws. 141
In keeping with the recommendations of the Commission, provisions to bring
the perpetrators of the Armenian massacres to justice were later included in the
Treaty of S~vres, but this treaty was never ratified. 49 Shortly thereafter, however,
such retributive efforts were nullified by the amnesty declaration that accompanied
the Treaty of Lausanne.15
0
E. Final Recommendations
In an effort to facilitate implementation of the recommendations included in
its Report, the Commission proposed a set of draft articles for inclusion in peace
treaties with the Central Powers. 15 ' These articles provided, inter alia, that the
enemy government: (1) admit the right of every Allied State, even after peace was
concluded, to try and punish any enemy or former enemy who came into the
Allies' custody; (2) recognize the right of the Allies to establish a High Tribunal,
with judges appointed by the Allies, to try and punish enemies for war crimes and
violations of the laws of humanity; (3) agree that trials conducted and sentences
imposed by enemy tribunals would not bar subsequent trial by the High Tribunal
or by Allied national courts; (4) deliver to the Allies any accused sought for trial;
and (5) furnish to the Allies any documents that might be necessary for
identification purposes or that might be utilized as evidence.' 52  However, as
discussed below, these recommendations were only partially integrated into the
Treaty of Versailles.
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
Following the work of the 1919 Commission, the Allies proceeded to
deliberate on the Treaty of Versailles, which took into account the Commission's
work, but only in part. It did not include crimes against the laws of humanity,
153. U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, reprinted in VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF WAR, supra note 21, at 74-75.
154. See id. at 76; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
155. See infra notes 306-312 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 313-322 and accompanying text.
157. See 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at 27.
158. See Provisions for Insertion in Treaties with Enemy Governments, in 1919 Commission
Report, supra note 69, Annex IV [hereinafter Provisions], at 81-82.
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which the Commission eventually recommended and the United States opposed,
and it included the prosecution of the Kaiser, which the Commission rejected. The
Treaty did, however, include war crimes, which the Commission recommended.
A. Applicable Treaty Provisions
The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, and contained the
following provisions relating to criminal responsibility for wartime conduct:
Article 227
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern,
formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality
and the sanctity of treaties.
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the
guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges,
one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of
America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international
policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international
undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the
punishment which it considers should be imposed.
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the
Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be
put on trial.
Article 228
The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated
Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed
acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found
guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply
notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or
in the territory of her allies.
The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or
to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed
an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by
name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the German
authorities.
Article 229
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and
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Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied
and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of
members of the military tribunals of the powers concerned.
In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.
Article 230
The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of
every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the
full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders and the just
appreciation of responsibility.' 
53
In addition, following directly after the war crimes clauses was the
contentious war-responsibility clause, Article 231, which played a central role in
German negotiations with the Allies over the acceptance of Articles 227 to 230.
This clause, known throughout Germany as the "Schuldartikel," or article on
guilt, 154 provided as follows:
Article 231
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the
responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to
which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been
subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of
Germany and her allies.
155
These provisions of the Versailles Treaty introduced several major
innovations into international criminal law. First of all, Article 227 set a historical
basis in precedent for prosecution of a head of state for what Article 6(a) of the
Nuremberg Charter called "crimes against peace. 156 For the first time in history, a
treaty established the individual criminal responsibility of heads of states for
initiating and conducting what was later called a war of aggression. Secondly, the
war crimes clauses provided for the trial of Germans, including military and
civilian personnel, in the courts of their wartime opponents for violations of the
laws and customs of war or before jointly established Allied tribunals. 51 "For the
first time, a major international peace treaty had established the principle in
159. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 95, arts. 227-230, at 153.
160. VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 414.
161. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 95, art. 231, at 153.
162. See Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 66, at 411.
163. Id; UNWCC, supra note 122, at 44 ("[T]he Peace Treaties of that period sanctioned the
principle that any persons, civilians or members of the Armed Forces, accused of violations of the laws
of war, could be tried and punished for such violations by the courts of the adversary.").
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international law that war crimes [criminal responsibility] was a proper conclusion
of peace, that the termination of war did not bring a general amnesty as a matter of
course."1
58
B. The "Kaiser Clause "-Article 22 7
After abdicating the throne on November 9, 1918, the Kaiser went to the
Netherlands where he received asylum after giving assurances that he would not
engage in any political activity. Thus, any prosecution would require his
extradition from Holland.
The idea of holding the Kaiser accountable originated with the British and
was introduced for a variety of political purposes, though not necessarily with the
expectation that it would be carried out. 159  In 1918, the British Imperial War
Cabinet received a recommendation from legal officers of the British crown
suggesting that Wilhelm II be arraigned in front of an Allied tribunal after being
extradited from Holland. 160  Specifically, an international war crimes trial was
proposed by Lord Curzon at the War Cabinet meeting of November 20, 1918.161
On November 28, 1918, the War Cabinet unanimously adopted this
recommendation, stating that "so far as the British Government have the power,
the ex-kaiser should be held personally responsible for his crimes against
international law." 162  The proposition was novel and could have far-reaching
implications in the future.
164. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 85. Cf Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 89 ("[l~t was the general
practice to insert in peace treaties an amnesty clause for persons guilty of wrongful acts during the
war.").
165. See WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 213. Interestingly, during the course of their deliberations
on the fate of the Kaiser, the British commissioned a detailed study on their earlier decision to exile
Napoleon to St. Helena. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS
OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 37 (2000).
166. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 213.
167. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 17
(2000). On this occasion, Lord Curzon referred to the Kaiser as "the arch-criminal of the world."
BASS, supra note 159, at 65. Lloyd George forcefully contended that Wilhelm 11 should stand trial. Id.
at 66. At this initial meeting, however, Curzon and Lloyd George were unable to persuade the cabinet.
Id. In fact, their proposals were met with numerous objections. For example, the Australian prime
minister noted that it was not illegal to make war, as such was the prerogative of sovereigns. Id. at 66-
67. Churchill was concerned that an inquiry into the Kaiser's responsibility might lead to embarrassing
revelations about Russia's role in the crisis that led to war in 1914. Id. at 68. Austen Chamberlain
feared that singling out the Kaiser might create a "Napoleonic legend" and-rather prophetically-
might lead to a nationalistic uprising in Germany. Id. at 67. By way of historical footnote, Hermann
Goring first heard Adolph Hitler speak at a rally held in opposition to French demands to try Germans
as war criminals. See BASS, supra note 159, at 60, 92.
168. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 213. See BASS, supra note 159, at 69-73. During this meeting,
Attorney General Smith asserted that Wilhelm II was responsible on the basis of the doctrine of
command responsibility. Id. at 69-70. Smith then suggested that the Kaiser could be punished, like
Napoleon, without a formal trial or, in the alternative, could be prosecuted before an international
tribunal. Id. at 70-71. Gary Bass described the ironic circumstances surrounding the historic outcome
of this meeting as follows:
At the end of the greatest war in history to date, the decision about the fate of Britain's
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On December 2, 1918, this resolution was approved by French Premier
Georges Clemenceau and Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando during their meeting in
London with British Prime Minister Lloyd George. 163 Shortly thereafter, Great
Britain informed the United States about the Entente's adoption of the resolution
proposing a trial for the Kaiser and his "accomplices."' 64 Prior to this time,
however, no serious thought had been given by the government of the United
States to the concept of conducting war trials before an international court.1
6 5
In late January 1919, United States State Department legal experts James
Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller submitted a memorandum representing the
American position on the British proposal. 166 Their study found that there was no
legal justification for trying the German government for authoring the war because
such an act did not constitute a violation of existing international law.167 Next,
Scott and Miller concluded that the Kaiser was not legally responsible because of
his status as a sovereign.168 Finally, the experts noted that, even if the Germans
had transgressed certain of the Hague rules, it would be impossible to extradite
them. 169
Following Lloyd George's refusal to restrict discussion of the Kaiser's fate to
the Supreme Council 170 and in light of the subsequent impasse on this question
reached by the Commission and the American delegation, 17 1 the Council of Four
finally tackled the issue at Paris. On April 8, 1919, the Big Four extensively
discussed the propriety of trying the Kaiser. 172  During these deliberations,
President Wilson repeatedly opposed the Entente plan. Not only did he believe
that "the evidence would be lacking," but he also feared that any physical
punishment of Wilhelm II would turn him into a martyr and could revitalize the
Hohenzollern dynasty. Furthermore, Wilson objected to the thought of
transgressing existing legal norms just to satiate public sentiment. 73 In this latter
demur, he received the support of Italian Premier Orlando.'
74
In response, French Premier Clemenceau argued that the law of responsibility
superseded all others and that the Council had a unique opportunity to enlarge this
rudimentary principle of national law into one of an international character. 75
British Prime Minister Lloyd George declared that the English people would not
chief adversary had not been made on the basis of the arguments of the general staff, or
foreign secretary, or war secretary. It had been made on the authority of the attorney
general and a committee of lawyers. Id. at 73.
169. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 213.
170. SCHWABE, supra note 80, at 164.
171. Id. at 163-64.




176. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
178. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 215-16.
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accept a treaty that did not resolve this critical question.' 76  The British prime
minister then proposed that the Kaiser be tried only for violating the 1839 Treaty
of London that guaranteed Belgian neutrality. 177
Under the pressure of this unified opposition and cognizant of his upcoming
meeting before the Commission on the League of Nations to get approval for an
amendment regarding the United States' Monroe Doctrine, 178 President Wilson
consulted that evening with Secretary Lansing in order to prepare compromise
proposals. 179 In fact, President Wilson's draft articles were, in essence, dictated by
Lansing--"recommendations that Lansing must have known would undermine the
proposed prosecution of the kaiser."180  In the words of Dr. Scott, the State
Department legal advisor:
The original draft prepared as a compromise by President Wilson himself-for he
was adverse to any proceeding against the kaiser-contained an express denial
that the offense was criminal, but at the suggestion, it is believed, of Mr. Lloyd
George, this was omitted. Arraigning the kaiser solely for an offense against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties, and declaring that the judgment
of the tribunal would be guided by the highest motives of international policy,
were in effect an admission that law, in the legal sense of the word, did not exist
for either offense, or that its violation was not a crime in the sense of criminal
law.181
The following morning, April 9, 1919, Wilson presented his draft articles to
the Allied Supreme Council, and they were approved.18 2 These proposals provided
the specific basis for Articles 227 and 229..3 and for the Treaty of Versailles'
182. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 215.
183 See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 79. The Commission's Report contained a discussion of
Belgian neutrality, including reference to Article I of the Treaty of London of April 19, 1839 and
subsequent Prussian declarations in relation thereto. See 1919 Commission Report, supra note 69, at
12-15. The need to anchor such a concept of responsibility to an existing intemational treaty was
evident in the Nuremberg and Tokyo charges of "crimes against peace." The treaty in these cases was
the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which benignly stated: "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare
in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with
one another." General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at
Paris Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, 63.
184 WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 216. The Monroe Doctrine was officially enunciated by
President James Monroe in a message to Congress on December 2, 1823. The doctrine forbade
European interference in the affairs of the Americas and asserted, "[a]s a principle in which the rights
and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as
subjects for future colonization by any European powers." 5 AMERICA: GREAT CRISES, supra note 23,
at 288, 293.
185. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 216; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 80.
186. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 80.
187. Scott, supra note 45, at 237.
188.- SCHWABE, supra note 80, at 294; WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 216; WILLIS, supra note 21,
at 80.
189. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 216.
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penalty provisions, Articles 227 to 230, in general. 8 4 Pursuant to Wilson's draft
articles, under which the Kaiser would be tried by a special tribunal for violating
the neutrality of Belgium, "[iut was assumed that the tribunal would pronounce a
verdict of guilty in a political and moral sense, but it would not be conducting
actual criminal proceedings against the Kaiser, that is, the possibility of a death
sentence was precluded."'' 8 5 On May 1, 1919, however, Lloyd George influenced
the Council to strike the language from Wilson's proposal that explicitly prevented
the Kaiser from being tried on criminal charges.
8 6
In its final form, Article 227 charged the Kaiser with having committed "a
supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." This
accusation, however, did not constitute a violation of existing international law
and, instead, simply expressed a "political" transgression and not an international
crime. 187  Said another way, Article 227 articulated a "moral", rather than a
"legal", offense.8' Not coincidentally, the political nature of this provision
corresponded directly with the position championed by the American delegation
during the Commission's deliberations, namely:
that there were two classes of responsibilities, those of a legal nature and those of
a moral nature, that legal offences were justiciable and liable to trial and
punishment by appropriate tribunals, but that moral offences, however iniquitous
and infamous and however terrible in their results, were beyond the reach of
judicial procedure, and subject only to moral sanctions.1
8 9
Additional considerations indicating that Article 227 was not actually
intended to produce a trial include the fact that the charge, as phrased, likely failed
to satisfy existing extradition standards, 190 namely, the principle of "double
criminality," which requires that the offense for which extradition is sought
constitutes a crime in both countries, 191 since such a crime did not exist in Dutch
criminal law. The realization that the provision's principal proponents, the British,
"were not eager to prosecute a crowned head, particularly when the family lineage
of that crowned head was related to their own monarchy."' 192 In this latter regard,
Secretary of State Lansing was of the opinion that the British were forced by
190. See SCHWABE, supra note 80, at 294; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 80.
191. SCHWABE, supra note 80, at 294.
192. Id.
193. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 19; UNWCC, supra note 122, at 44;
see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 502-
83 (4th rev. ed. 2002). See generally CHRISTINE VAN DEN WUNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE
EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
194. UNWCC, supra note 122, at 44.
195. U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 58-59.
196. See Scott, supra note 45, at 240-41; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 66.
197. For a discussion of extraditable offenses and double criminality, see BASSIOUNI, supra note
187, at 388-96.
198. Bassiouni, supra note 66, at 411.
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public pressure to champion the trial of the Kaiser and were actually relying on the
Americans to prevent the occurrence of such a proceeding.
93
The British also knew that the Netherlands, which had granted asylum to the
Kaiser, would not subsequently surrender him for trial. Thus, the British
government could represent itself to world public opinion, particularly its own, as
supporting the French and Belgian position, with the reasonable expectation that
the Kaiser's trial would never take place. The blame for that outcome could
therefore be placed on others. Indeed, in the course of time, the literature on that
subject blamed the Netherlands for refusing to extradite the Kaiser. For some
unknown reason, the role of the United States was not included in subsequent legal
commentaries on the failure to prosecute the Kaiser.
C. War Crimes Clauses-Articles 228 to 230
The origins of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles can be found
in a memorandum submitted to the Commission by the American delegation.194 In
this memorandum, the United States advocated the use of military commissions or
tribunals, in contrast to the creation of a new international criminal court, that had
jurisdiction to try violations of the laws and customs of war. 95 The American
memorandum provided as follows:
1. That the military authorities, being charged with the interpretation of the laws
and customs of war, possess jurisdiction to determine and punish violations
thereof;
2. That the military jurisdiction for the trial of persons accused of violations of
the laws and customs of war and for the punishment of persons found guilty of
such offences is exercised by military tribunals;
3. That the jurisdiction of a military tribunal over a person accused of the
violation of a law or custom of war is acquired when the offence was committed
on the territory of the nation creating the military tribunal or when the person or
property injured by the offence is of the same nationality as the military tribunal;
4. That the law and procedure to be applied and followed in determining and
punishing violations of the laws and customs of war are the law and the procedure
for determining and punishing such violations established by the military law of
the country against which the offence is committed; and
5. That in case of acts violating the laws and customs of war involving more than
one country, the military tribunals of the countries affected may be united, thus
199. WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 215.
200. See Scott, supra note 45, at 250.
201. See U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 70-71.
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forming an international tribunal for the trial and punishment of persons charged
with the commission of such offences.
196
These principles, which were incorporated into Articles 228 and 229, brought
nothing new to international law. Prior to the First World War, it was well
established that a belligerent nation had the right to try persons charged with
violating the laws and customs of war if they fell into its custody and had
committed such offenses on its soil or against its nationals or their property. 97
Military tribunals traditionally had the jurisdictional competence to entertain such
war crimes prosecutions.1 98 In addition, although Article 229 provided for a mixed
tribunal composed of individuals from more than one of the member nations, the
Allies did not contemplate a supranational, or even an international, court.
Accordingly, the transition to the Leipzig trials was relatively easy.' 99
202. U.S. Dissenting Report, 1919, supra note 69, at 70-7 1.
203. MYREs S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR:
TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 706 (1994) ("This doctrine could hardly be
regarded as novel or revolutionary even before the First World War."); Bierzanek, supra note 103, at
89.
It was generally accepted that international law permitted the trial of persons charged
with breaches of the customs of war if they fell into the hands of the country whose
citizens had been the victims of their offenses. For this purpose special courts might be
set up. The right of a victorious power to bring to trial individual members of enemy
armies accused of violating the laws of war was recognized by international custom.
Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 89.
204. Richard R. Baxter, The Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War
Crimes, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 65, 72 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P.
Nanda eds., 1973).
205. This is probably why Grand-Admiral Karl DOnitz, who was appointed by Hitler as Reich
President during the final days of World War II, issued an ordinance directing the Supreme Court at
Leipzig to adjudicate war crimes cases-just as the tribunal had done following the First World War.
See DAVID IRVING, NUREMBERG: THE LAST BATTLE 49-50 (1996). Pursuant to this precedent, there
would be criminal responsibility for Germans who had committed violations of national law.
Significantly, the Allies initially recognized the legitimacy of Dinitz's government, which had
withdrawn to Flensburg, when negotiating the instruments of surrender. Id On May 7, 1945, Colonel-
General Alfred Jodil signed the initial surrender instrument at General Eisenhower's headquarters in
Rheims. Id. at 50. This surrender, however, was not to go into effect until May 9; the delay was
designed to allow hundreds of thousands of German civilians and military personnel to escape the
rapidly advancing Soviet army. Id. On May 9, 1945, the overall instrument of surrender of the General
High Command was signed by Field-Marshall Wilhelm Keitel at Soviet headquarters in Berlin-
Karlshorst. Id. As one commentator noted, "[I]t is important to keep in mind that there has never been
an unconditional surrender of Germany, but only of the German armed forces." Max Rheinstein, The
Legal Status of Occupied Germany, 47 MICH. L. REV. 23, 23 (1948).
Then, on May 15, 1945, Dtnitz issued the aforementioned ordinance calling for war crimes
trials-to be conducted before the Supreme Court at Leipzig. Id. at 50. A copy of this pronouncement
was sent to Eisenhower, but he did not.reply. When Eisenhower next sent his advisors to meet with
Donitz, the latter suggested a joint Allied-German effort against the Soviets. See id. Within less than a
week after this proposal, Donitz and his entire government at Flensburg were arrested by the Allies.
See id. at 51. In so doing, the Allies effectively "dissolve[d] the German government." Rheinstein,
supra, at 24. See Kelsen, supra note 31, at 519 ("By abolishing the last Government of Germany the
victorious powers have destroyed the existence of Germany as a sovereign state."). In sum,
[N]o matter what the Allies did, Germany at that time had a legitimate government
which was briefly recognized by the Allies when it suited them and that very German
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When Article 228 was finalized,2 °0  prosecutions were restricted to
"violation[s] of the laws and customs of war." This eliminated trials predicated
upon the "laws of humanity," as well as reliance upon the doctrine of "negative
criminality" - both substantial concerns that the United States had addressed in its
Memorandum of Reservations.20 1  In addition, by providing for trials "before
military tribunals" in Articles 228 and 229, the Americans, by means of one of
President Wilson's April 9, 1919, compromise proposals,20 2 were able to prevent
the creation of an international criminal court, as envisioned by the Commission.2 3
On the other hand, Article 230, which required the German government to
furnish the Allies with information and documentary evidence to facilitate war
trials, appears simply to have been a condensation of Articles V and VI from the
Commission's recommended draft articles.2 °4
D. War-Guilt Clause-Article 231
Article 231, although not textually linked to Articles 227 through 230,
became inextricably intertwined with these penalty provisions during German
negotiations with the Allies over the Versailles Treaty.20 '
The provision that became famous as the "war-guilt" clause actually stemmed
from a compromise proposal originally made by John Foster Dulles in February
1919,206 which was then submitted to the Commission on Reparation of
Damage.207 Dulles' draft proposals were designed to conceptually acknowledge
Germany's responsibility for reparations (Article 231), while restricting its actual
government wanted to prosecute war criminals. The Allies could not accept such a
proposition because it would have legitimized the Dbnitz government and precluded the
Four Major Allies to claim that there was no legitimate government of Germany and
hence assume the role of Germany's government. Thus, they ignored the Donitz
proposal and proceeded with their own plans.
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 109, at 84.
Interestingly, the subsequent trials that occurred in the Allied zones of occupation could
properly be classified as domestic, rather than international, prosecutions because of the Allies' exercise
of sovereign authority in Germany. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 30; cf
Rheinstein, supra, at 25.
206. The phrase "punishments laid down by military law" in the May 7, 1919 text of the first
paragraph was changed in the final version to read "punishments laid down by law." See VERSAILLES
AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 376.
207. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 80; see also supra notes 107-111, 141-143 and accompanying
text.
208. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text. The first clause of Wilson's proposal
"provided for trial before Allied national or mixed military tribunals of persons accused of violating the
laws and customs of war." WILLIS, supra note 21, at 80.
209. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 80.
210. See Provisions, supra note 152, arts. V, VI, at 82.
211. See infra notes 216-245 and accompanying text.
212. At the time, John Foster Dulles was considered a "leading American representative" on the
Commission on Reparation of Damage. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 98, at 56-57. He was later
appointed Secretary of State under President Eisenhower.
213. See SCHWABE, supra note 80, at 289; VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 413;
WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 288; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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liability to Germany's limited ability to pay (Article 232).08 Similarly, Norman
Davis, President Wilson's chief financial advisor in Paris, recommended: "It can
be said that Germany was morally responsible for the war and all the consequences
thereof, and legally that she is responsible in accordance with the formula adopted
for damage to property and to persons. '2 °9
In short, the United States wanted Article 231, the foundation for reparations,
to remain "purely theoretical and have no binding character in either a legal or
practical way if it was to be included in the treaty at all. 210 In fact, during the
initial discussion on the subject of reparations, Wilson had the reference to
Germany's guilt stricken altogether. 211 The other Entente powers, however,
ultimately prevailed and thus, in its final form, Article 231 represented a decidedly
British and French formulation.212
In the view of the Allies:
Article 231 was regarded... as establishing th[e] basis for the assessment of
reparation. The question of responsibility for the war, as distinguished from the
damage resulting from it, was considered elsewhere in the peace conference and
the conclusions were exhibited in Part VII, Penalties, of the treaty. Those
provisions were narrowed down to the responsibility of individuals and afforded
slight ground for argument on the broad question. Article 231 was a general
statement, modified by article 232.213
On the other hand, the Germans construed Article 231 as forming the basis
upon which the threatened war crimes prosecutions were based,214 universally
denounced the clause as the "war-guilt lie," and saw the provision as a blank check
by which the Allies could make unlimited reparation demands.
21 5
E. German Negotiations on the Provisions of the Treaty of Versailles
When the Germans first learned of the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty,
mass demonstrations erupted.216 Articles 227 to 231 met with nearly unanimous
214. See TRACHTENBERG, supra note 98, at 56; WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 288; cf VERSAILLES
AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 414 ("It was perfectly clear from the discussion that this form was chosen
simply to establish the potential extent of responsibility in clause I (art. 231) and to define its
limitations in clause 2 (art. 232) .... ).
215. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 98, at 56-57 (quoting I REPARATION AT THE PARIS PEACE
CONFRENCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION 826 (Philip Mason Burnett ed.,
Columbia Univ. Press 1940) (emphasis added)). See WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 288.
216. SCHWABE, supra note 80, at 289-90 (citing PAUL MANTOUX, I DES DELIBERATIONS Du
CONSEIL QUATRE 83 1955).
217. Id. at 290.
218. Jd.
219. VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 414.
220. Id. at 372 ("The German delegation linked thie] issue of penalties to the question of
responsibility for the war.").
221. See id. at 414-19; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 72; WALWORTH, supra note 59, at 288.
222. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 83.
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opposition.217 The war-guilt clause, Article 231, caused particular outrage.2 18 In
fact, when the Treaty was given to the German delegation at Versailles on May 7,
1919,2 19 Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, President of the German peace committee,
retorted, "It is demanded of us that we shall confess ourselves to be alone guilty of
the war. Such a confession from my lips would be a lie.",220 In addition, he made
the following reply:
Crimes in war may not be excusable, but they are committed in struggle for
victory, and in defense of national existence, and under the influence of passions
which deaden the conscience of peoples. The hundreds of thousands of non-
combatants who have perished since the 1 1th of November by reason of the
blockade, were killed with cold deliberation after our adversaries had conquered
and victory had been assured them. Think of that when you speak of guilt and of
punishment.
22 1
Brockdorff-Rantzau was, of course, referring to the Allied hunger blockade,
"a measure contrary to the law of nations,,,222 which, pursuant to Article 26 of the
223. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 82.
224. Id. at 84.
225. Id. at 83.
226. Address of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, May 7, 1919, reprinted in GERMAN WHITE BOOK
CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR 3 (Div. of Int'l Law, Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace trans., 1924) [hereinafter GERMAN WHITE BOOK].
227. Id. at 4.
228. Note of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, President of the German Delegation, to Georges
Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference (May 24, 1919), reprinted in GERMAN WHITE BOOK,
supra note 220, at 10. Britain's "distant" blockade of Germany was in violation of the Declaration of
Paris of 1856, which directed that "[bilockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say,
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." Declaration
Respecting Maritime Law (Declaration of Paris), Apr. 16, 1856, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 699, 700
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1981). See VINCENT, supra note 24, at 34.
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Armistice agreement of November 11, 1918,223 was maintained with tragic
consequences long after the Germans had laid down their arms.224
Because the Allies refused to negotiate in person with the Germans at
Versailles, the German peace delegation was left with no other option but to
225submit its counterproposals in writing. In response to Article 227, the German
delegation stated that there was no legal basis upon which to prosecute the Kaiser,
especially in light of the fact that there was no penalty prescribed for the political
conduct alleged against him at the time the act was committed.226  Similarly, the
delegation pointed out that the German code prevented the surrender of individuals
subject to prosecution under Article 228.27
The Germans, however, expressed their desire to see violations of
international law punished severely and, to that end, proposed that questions
pertaining to offenses against the laws and customs of war be submitted to "an
international tribunal of neutrals competent to judge all violations by nationals of
all the signatories." 228  Punishment, according to this plan, would remain the
province of the national courts.229
On May 13, 1919, Brockdorff-Rantzau, quoting Article 231, requested that
the Allies provide the German Peace Delegation with a copy of the Allied Report
of the Commission on Responsibility.230  One week later, Georges Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference, wrote a response in which he refused to provide
229. Armistice with Germany, Nov. 11, 1918, art. 26, reprinted in 2 BEVANS 9, 14. Article 26
provided as follows:
The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to
remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to
capture. The Allies and United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during
the armistice as shall be found necessary.
Id. at 14.
In their Declaration that accompanied the Armistice, the German Plenipotentiaries pointed out
that "the carrying out of this agreement must throw the German people into anarchy and famine."
Declaration of German Plenipotentiaries, Nov. I1, 1918, reprinted in 2 BEVANS 18, 18. The delegation
further noted that, "[a]ccording to the declarations which preceded the armistice, conditions were to be
expected which, while completely insuring the military situation of our opponents, would have ended
the sufferings of women and children who took no part in the war." Id., reprinted in 2 BEVANS 18, 19.
The November 1 Ith armistice terms, which included the continuation of the hunger blockade,
were renewed on a number of successive occasions. See Prolonging of Armistice with Germany, Dec.
13, 1918, reprinted in 2 BEVANs 23; Prolonging of Armistice with Germany, Jan. 16, 1919, reprinted in
2 BEVANS 24; Prolonging of Armistice with Germany, Feb. 16, 1919, reprinted in 2 BEVANS 28.
230. For a discussion of the Allied hunger blockade and its aftermath, see generally VINCENT,
supra note 24.
231. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 83.




236. Note of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, President of the German Delegation, to Georges
Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference (May 13, 1919), at 6.
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the Germans with a copy of the Commission Report, referring to it as a document
of"an internal character. 23'
Despite being denied the Allied Report, the Germans assembled a panel,
which included the renowned sociologist Max Weber, to challenge the
Commission's findings.232 Forced to rely solely on news reports,233 the expert
panel prepared a response by May 27, 1919.234 The panel began its Observations
by emphasizing the need for a neutral commission to decide such grave questions
as war guilt:
[T]he question of the responsibility for the outbreak of war can not be decided by
one side which was itself a party to the war, but that only a commission of inquiry,
recognized by both sides as impartial, to which all records are accessible and
before which both parties alike can state their case, can venture to pronounce
judgment ... 235
The panel took special note of the Commission's failure to mention the
significance of the general Russian mobilization or the Pan-Slavist plans to annex
the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. 23 6 According to the panel, Germany, faced
with the reality of a war to be fought on both fronts, was forced by necessity to
engage in a defensive war.23 7
In reply to German assertions that justice in the victors' tribunals would be
one-sided, the Allies stated that it would be "impossible to entrust in any way the
trial of those directly responsible for offences against humanity and international
right to their accomplices in their crimes. 238 In addition to rejecting the remainder
of the German arguments in toto,239 the Allied reply contained an ultimatum
demanding an agreement to sign the treaty as it stood; otherwise, the Allies
promised to "take such steps as they think needful to enforce their Terms.
240
On June 22, 1919, with just one day remaining under the Allied ultimatum,
the German delegation sent a note to Clemenceau stating its intention to fulfill all
of the conditions imposed by the Versailles Treaty, except those contained in
237. Note of Georges Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, to Count Brockdorff-
Rantzau, President of the German Delegation (May 20, 1919), reprinted in GERMAN WHITE BOOK,
supra note 226, at 7.
238. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 84.
239. See id.; VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 372 (noting that "somehow the report got
into the press").
240. See Observations on the Report of the Commission of the Allied and Associated Governments
on the Responsibility of the Authors of War, May 27, 1919 [hereinafter Observations], reprinted in
GERMAN WHITE BOOK, supra note 226, at 31-43.
241. Id. at31.
242. See id at 35, 37, 40; cf DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 6.
243. Observations, supra note 234, at 36-37.
244. UNWCC, supra note 122, at 44-45.
245. See VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 372.
246. Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on
the Conditions of Peace, and Ultimatum, Letter of Georges Clemenceau, President of the Peace
Conference, to President of the German Delegation, Covering the Reply of the Allied and Associated
Powers (June 16, 1919), reprinted in VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 44, 54.
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Articles 227 and 231 ;241 moreover, the note concluded with the following
declaration:
The Government of the German Republic is ready to sign the treaty of peace
without ... undertaking any responsibility for delivering persons in accordance
with Articles 227 to 230 of the treaty of peace.
242
In response, the Allies issued a new ultimatum threatening to invade Germany
the next day.243 Lacking sufficient military resources, the German government
unconditionally accepted the Allied terms just several minutes before the
expiration of the ultimatum on June 23.244 Five days later the treaty was opened
for signature in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors.245
OUTCOMES
A. Attempted Arrest and Extradition of Kaiser Wilhelm II
At the end of the war, Kaiser Wilhelm II and the crown prince sought asylum
in the Netherlands. Queen Wilhelmina sympathized with the Emperor, who was
then housed in the country estate of Count Bentinck at Amerongen. 246 It was from
this chateau that the Kaiser formally abdicated on November 28, 1918, and asked
that German officials and members of the military "protect the German people
against the menacing dangers of anarchy, famine, and foreign domination. 24 7
At the beginning of the following year, a bold attempt was made to arrest the
Kaiser in Holland - a fascinating, but forgotten, footnote of history, the accuracy of
which has been obscured by the passage of time and colored by the brush of
legend. Willis relates an incident involving a United States Lieutenant Colonel
Luke Lea, a former United States senator:
Lea led six soldiers to Amerongen just after New Year's Day. They planned to
seize the kaiser by surprise and roar off to Paris, daring the Dutch to shoot while
the kaiser was held prisoner in their car. Near Amerongen, however, they came
upon a washed-out bridge and saw that capture was inevitable at that point in a
return trip. What had begun as a serious undertaking consequently turned into a
semicomic confrontation. The Americans determined to persuade the kaiser to go
with them voluntarily to face his accusers manfully. They continued on to the
Bentinck estate on the night of January 5, bluffed their way inside the house, and
demanded to see Wilhelm II. After a two-hour standoff, during which the kaiser
247 See VERSAILLES AND AFTER, supra note 26, at 373.
248. Id.
249. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 85.
250. See id.
251. STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 281.
252. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 66.
253. 12 AMERICA: GREAT CRISES, supra note 23, at 187-88.
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refused to meet with the Americans, Dutch troops surrounded the estate with
spotlights and machine guns, forcing Colonel Lea and his men to depart.
248
No further attempts were made to apprehend the Kaiser.
Several weeks after the attempted arrest of Wilhelm II, the Allies submitted a
request to the Netherlands to turn over the Kaiser for trial.249 The Allied demand
stated, in part:
In addressing this demand to the Dutch Government the powers believe it their
duty to emphasize its special character. It is their duty to insure the execution of
Article 227 without allowing themselves to be stopped by arguments, because it is
not a question of a public accusation with juridical character as regards its basis,
but an act of high international policy imposed by the universal conscience, in
which legal forms have been provided solely to assure to the accused such
guarantees as were never before recognized in public law.
250
This request, however, was in the nature of a diplomatic note, and the Dutch
were informed that the Allies would not press for the Kaiser's extradition. 251 Dr.
Scott commented on the Supreme Council's demand as follows: "In endeavoring
to impose a duty upon Holland [to surrender Wilhelm II] and to bring that country
to a realization of this duty, as the supreme council saw it, the note dwelt upon the
peculiar nature of the offense, and in so doing supplied Holland with an answer
which would defeat the purpose, if indeed the Allied Governments wished at this
time the surrender of the former German kaiser.,
252
On January 23, 1920, the Dutch denied the Allies' request, citing Holland's
long tradition of providing political refuge, Dutch national law, and the fact that
Holland had not signed, and was thus not subject to, the Treaty of Versailles.
253
But it was the very wording of Article 227 that gave substance to the Dutch
argument. The idea that there existed a "supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties" was simply not a valid legal basis for
extradition; furthermore, the choice of these words evidenced the political nature
254. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 100-01. See also Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 66, at
411-12.
255. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 107. Lord Birkenhead, the lord chancellor, was sent to Paris by
Lloyd George to assist in the preparation of the demand. Birkenhead, who was formerly known as Sir
F.E. Smith, had advised the British prime minister from the start regarding the Kaiser's trial. Id. The
formal request was filed 15 Jan. 1920, and was submitted to the government of the Queen of The
Netherlands on behalf of the 26 Allied Powers who signed the treaty of peace. The response of The
Netherlands denying the request was signed on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of The Netherlands by
Mr. Herman Von Karnebeek on 23 Jan. 1920. It was followed by a protest by David Lloyd George on
behalf of the Allied Powers. See Weekblad van Hetreeh, nos. 10511 and 10529. Also reported in 47
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE ET DE LEGISLATION COMPARE 37-45 (1920); and in A. MtRIGNAC
& E. LEMONON, LE DROIT DES GENS ET LA GUERRE DE 1914-1918 580 (Paris, 1921).
256. Scott, supra note 45, at 243.
257. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 107.
258. Scott, supra note 45, at 242-43.
259. See id. at 24344; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 107-08; see also Bassiouni, From Versailles to
Rwanda, supra note 68, at 18 & n.21.
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of the conduct charged as a "crime," which neither existed in Dutch law, nor in
international law.
On February 14, 1920, the Allied council of ambassadors sent a second
demand to Holland.254 In early March, the Dutch government, as before, refused to
honor the Allies' petition - this time replying that compliance would be
"incompatible with the national honor if [Holland] consented, at the request of the
powers, to violate the[] laws by abolishing the rights which they accord to a
fugitive finding himself within the country's territory.,
255
It was well understood in political circles that these impotent requests,
predicated upon Article 227, were made as a concession to the Entente masses,
who still anticipated a trial, and, on behalf of the French and Belgian governments,
as a means of humiliating the Hohenzollern dynasty.
25 6
B. War Crimes-The Leipzig Trials
After signing the Versailles Treaty, Germany prepared to deal with the
anticipated Allied request for the surrender of war criminals. 7 On November 5,
1919, in an effort to prevent such a calamitous event, and sensing an ambivalence
of the part of the Allies, Baron von Lersner proposed that Germans be permitted to
conduct the trials of accused war criminals in their own courts.258 Toward this end,
on December 13, 1919, the German legislature passed a special law
(Reichsgesetzblatt) that granted jurisdiction to the Reichsgericht, the German
Supreme Court, at Leipzig to try the defendants selected by the Allies.
259
On February 3, 1920, pursuant to Article 228, the Allies presented the
German ambassador, von Lersner, with a list of 895 persons 260 to be surrendered
as war criminals - a sharp contrast from the 20,000 originally named by the
Commission. 26 1 The publication of this list, which included such German military
leaders as Hindenburg and Ludendorff, caused immediate outrage in Germany.
262
The German ambassador threatened to resign, and the German government
responded by warning the Allies that the surrender of such national heroes could
260. Scott, supra note 45, at 244.
261. Id. at 245.
262. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 107; Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at
19.
263. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 113; See also, Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 92 ("As soon as the
Treaty of Versailles was ratified, the Germans embarked on diplomatic action to prevent the surrender
of their war criminals ....").
264. See WILLIS, supra note 2 1, at 118.
265. See CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS' TRIALS
AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 35 (1921); WILLIS, supra note 21, at 118.
266. The sources conflict as to the specific number of persons listed. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 109, at 520 (895 persons); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 17 (1992) (854 persons); cf. UNWCC, supra note 122, at
46 (896 persons); WILLIS, supra note 21, at 113 (854 persons); Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 92 (901
persons).
267. Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 66, at 412.
268. See UNWCC, supra note 122, at 46.
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imperil the stability of the weak Weimar Republic. 263 This struck a particular note
with the Allies, who, with good reason, were already fearful of a Bolshevik
takeover in Germany.
264
After appointing a commission, the Allies accepted Germany's offer to
conduct the trials before the Reichsgericht, with the caveat that if the Allies found
the prosecutions to be unsatisfactory, they reserved the right to try the defendants
before their own tribunals.265 Under this arrangement, the Allies had to submit
their cases, including their evidence, to the Procurator General of the Supreme
Court, who retained prosecutorial discretion as to which cases would be brought.266
In addition, after further negotiations, the Allies agreed to drastically reduce
the number of persons subject to prosecution.267 Based on this reaction, on March
31, 1920, an Inter-Allied Commission submitted a much shorter list of only forty-
five individuals, 268 but even that number was resisted by the Germans. In the end,
only twelve military officers were tried by the Reichsgericht. 69 Six of the cases
were submitted by the British, five by the French, and one by the Belgians. 270 The
Allies lost control of the situation when, in agreeing to have the German Supreme
Court try these offenders under German law, they were subject to the Procurator
General's discretion in initiating these prosecutions. The French and Belgians
were outraged and withdrew from the process; the British, however, remained
engaged in it with the intention to see it through no matter how symbolic the
outcome.
The trials finally commenced on May 23, 1921, some two and one-half years
after the signing of the Armistice.27 1 Of the twelve prosecutions undertaken, six
resulted in convictions.272 The British cases resulted in a greater than 80%
conviction rate; the cases submitted by the French enjoyed only a 20% success
rate; and the lone Belgian case ended in an acquittal. 73 The cases of greatest
interest today were those brought by the British, 74 and all three involved the
defense of obedience to superior orders.
269. See UNWCC, supra note 122, at 46; William A. Schabas, International Sentencing: From
Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996), in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 171, 172 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 2d ed. 1999); Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 19.
270. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 113; See also DEGRELLE, supra note 25, at 339-55, 375-91
(discussing the violent Communist activities taking place in Germany during this period). Cf ADOLF
EHRT, COMMUNISM IN GERMANY: THE COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY OF THE EVE OF THE 1933 NATIONAL
REVOLUTION 9-26 (photo. reprint 1990) (1933).
271. Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 93; UNWCC, supra note 122, at 46.
272. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 19-20.
273. See Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 66, at 413.
274. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 128.
275. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 20. In addition, a case was
prosecuted against Dr. Oskar Michelsohn, who was accused of deliberately contributing to the deaths of
hospitalized French prisoners. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 141. Dr. Michelsohn was acquitted. Id.
276. MULLINS, supra note 259, at 191.
277. See UNWCC, supra note 122, at 47.
278. MULLINS, supra note 259, at 191.
279. See id
280. See GERMAN WAR TRIALS: REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN
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In Robert Neumann's Case, a prison guard at a chemical factory at
Pommerensdorf was charged with brutalizing prisoners of war.275 On one
occasion, a group of British prisoners refused to work.276 After Trienke, the
defendant's superior, unsuccessfully tried to peaceably persuade the prisoners to
do their work, he called the Commandant for instructions.277 Thereafter, Trienke
ordered his sentries, including Neumann, to "set about the prisoners. 278  The
defendant admitted to using his fist against one prisoner during the incident.279
The court held that Neumann was not responsible:
He was covered by the order of his superior which he was bound to obey.
According to §47 of the Military Penal Code a subordinate can only be criminally
responsible under such circumstances, when he knows that his orders involve an
act which is a civil or military crime. That was not the case here. .... As matters
stood there could be no doubt of the legality of the order.
2
80
In other instances, however, the defendant was convicted of assault.28I
In the Dover Castle Case, a submarine commander, Lieutenant-Captain Karl
Neumann, was charged with torpedoing a British hospital ship in violation of the
10th Hague Convention.282 The commander admitted to torpedoing the ship, but
stated that he was only acting in obedience to orders.28 3 Specifically, because the
German government was convinced that the Allies were using hospital ships for
military purposes, the Admiralty had issued two memoranda to the Allies notifying
them that, unless enemy hospital ships kept to a certain course in the
Mediterranean and fulfilled other conditions, the vessels would be treated as ships
of war.284 The defendant believed that these orders constituted legitimate
reprisals.28 5 The court acquitted Neumann:
It is a military principle that the subordinate is bound to obey the orders of his
superiors. This duty of obedience is of considerable importance from the point of
view of the criminal law. Its consequence is that, when the execution of a service
order involves an offence against the criminal law, the superior giving the order is
alone responsible ..
LEIPZIG (London 1921) (providing an official overview of the British cases, including the complete
judgments rendered by the Reichsgericht).
281. MULLINS, supra note 259, at 88-89.
282. Judgment in Case of Robert Neumann (1921), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 697 (1922).
283. Id. at 697-98, 699.
284. Id. at 699.
285. Id. at 698.
286. Id. at 699.
287. MULLINS, supra note 259, at 97.
288. Id. at 99, 103-04.
289. Id. at 99-100.
290. See Judgment in Case of Commander Karl Neumann Hospital Ship "Dover Castle' (1921), 16
AM. J. INT'L L. 704, 706 (1922).
291. ld at 707.
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The Admiralty Staff was the highest authority over the accused. He was in duty
bound to obey their orders in service matters. So far as he did that, he was free
from criminal responsibility.
286
In contrast, in the Llandovery Castle Case, the defendants' superior order
defense was unsuccessful.28  In Llandovery Castle, a hospital ship was torpedoed
by a German U-boat in the Atlantic Ocean, in an area in which such ships were not
barred from traveling. 288  The commander of the U-boat, Helmut Patzig,
incorrectly believed that the ship was being used to transport troops and
munitions. 289 After three lifeboats were successfully deployed from the sinking
hospital ship, the U-boat fired shells at the lifeboats and caused the destruction of
two of them and the death of their occupants, according to the finding of the
court. 290 Because Patzig was not in custody, the court tried two first lieutenants,
Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt, who were with Patzig when the shells were
fired. 291 The defendants refused to give evidence at trial because of a promise of
silence they made to Patzig.
292
In finding the accused guilty as accessories, the court stated:
Patzig's order does not free the accused from guilt. It is true that according to
para. 47 of the Military Penal Code, if the execution of an order in the ordinary
course of duty involves such a violation of the law as is punishable, the superior
officer issuing such an order is alone responsible .... It is certainly to be urged in
favor of the military subordinates, that they are under no obligation to question the
order of their superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no such
confidence can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known to
everybody, including also the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against
the law. This happens only in rare and exceptional cases. But this case was
precisely one of them, for in the present instance, it was perfectly clear to the
accused that killing defenceless people in the life-boats could be nothing else but a
breach of the law .... They [the defendants] should, therefore, have refused to
obey. As they did not do so, they must be punished.
293
In sentencing the defendants, however, the court did consider the existence of
the superior order in mitigation.
294
In contrast to the British, the French and Belgians unwisely named high-
ranking individuals, especially in the case of German war hero General Karl
292. "Dover Castle ", supra note 290, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 704, 707.
293. See Judgment in Case of Lieutenant Dithmar and Boldt Hospital Ship "Llandovery Castle"
(1921), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 721-22 (1922).
294. See id. at 710.
295. See id. at 710, 712-14.
296. Id. at 711, 718-19. Although there were no witnesses to either the intended target or the effect
of the firings, the court concluded "beyond all doubt that ... Patzig attained his object so far as two of
the boats were concerned." Id at 718-19.
297. See MULLINS, supra note 259, at 107-08.
298. Llandovery Castle, supra note 293, at 716.
299. Id. at 721-722.
300. See id at 728.
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Stenger, and failed to authenticate their evidence. 295 As a consequence, only one
defendant was convicted in these cases.296
In particular, after N.C.O. Max Randohr was acquitted of having maltreated
and imprisoned Belgian children, the Belgian delegation left Leipzig in protest and
withdrew evidence it had previously submitted.297 Similarly, after failing to secure
the desired convictions of General Stenger and Lieutenant Laule, the French
Mission abruptly departed for Paris during the middle of the trial of Generals von
Schack and Krushka, following which the French issued a forceful protest to the
Germans. 298 By way of comparison, following the acquittal of General Stenger,
the one-legged war veteran was showered with flowers by a crowd of admiring
German spectators.299
On January 15, 1922, the Commission of Allied Jurists (Allied Jurists)
declared that the Reichsgericht had failed in carrying out its mandate and that
"some of the accused who were acquitted should have been condemned and... in
the case of those condemned the sentences were not adequate."300 The Allied
Jurists also recommended that Germany be required to extradite its war criminals
as provided for in Article 228.30 Although no further action was taken by the
Allies toward this goal,30 2 it should be noted that the French and Belgians did
prosecute accused German war criminals par contumace (in absentia).30 3
In assessing the failure of the Allies to enforce Articles 228 to 230 of the
Versailles Treaty, the United Nations War Crimes Commission cited to the
following factors: (1) the failure to promptly commence the war crimes trials,
when public support was still high; (2) lack of unity among the Allies; (3) the
world "was not internationally mature;" and (4) improper drafting of the war
crimes clauses.3°4 To these may be added the most significant influences of all,
namely, the priority of the Allies in maintaining peace and in fulfilling their
domestic political agendas over the quest for retributive justice.30 5
301. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 134; see also MULLINS, supra note 259, at 191 (noting that "the
Belgian and French evidence did not impress the Court as being impartial and credible").
302. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 134.
303. UNWCC, supra note 122, at 47; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 134-35.
304. See UNWCC, supra note 122, at 47; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 135-36.
305. UNWCC, supra note 122, at 50; WILLIS, supra note 21, at 135, 136.
306. UNWCC, supra note 122, at 48.
307. Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 94.
308. See id.
309. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 109, at 522; WILLIS, supra note 21,
at 142-45; see also Garner, supra note 54, at 81-82 (discussing the propriety of condemnation par
contumace).
310. UNWCC, supra note 122, at 52. President Wilson remarked that the war crimes clauses were
"the weak spot in the Treaty of Peace." BASS, supra note 159, at 100.
311. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rivanda, supra note 68, at 20. Popular German reaction to
the trials was overtly hostile. For example, after General Stenger's acquittal, he was met by cheering
crowds and was showered with flowers; in contrast, the crowd "taunted and spat upon members of the
French mission." WILLIS, supra note 21, at 136. Similarly, the German press, almost without
exception, highlighted the arguments of defense counsel. Id. at 131. In addition, the viability of the
principle of the defense of obedience to superior orders was strongly reaffirmed. See supra notes 275-
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C. Crimes Against the Laws of Humanity--Efforts to Prosecute Turkish Officials
for the Armenian Massacres
The 1919 Commission recommended that guilty persons from the Central
Powers be tried for crimes against the "laws of humanity."30 6 On August 10, 1920,
the Allies and Turkey signed the Treaty of S~vres.3 °7 In an attempt to ensure
prosecution of the perpetrators of the Armenian massacres, the Allies inserted, in
addition to war crimes clauses virtually identical to Articles 228 to 230 of the
Versailles Treaty, 30 ' a special provision that addressed the mass killings. Article
230 of the Treaty of S~vres provided, in pertinent part:
The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the
persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the
massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which
formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914.
The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the tribunal which
shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish government undertakes to
recognise such tribunal.
In the event of the League of Nations having created in sufficient time a tribunal
competent to deal with the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to
themselves the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before such




Although the Advisory Committee of Jurists shortly thereafter recommended
the establishment of a High Court of International Justice to "try crimes against
international public order and the universal law of nations, 3 10 the League of
Nations ignored the proposal.3 11 In any event, the Treaty of S~vres was not
ratified, and Article 230 was therefore never implemented.
312
British and Turkish domestic attempts to bring the suspects to trial were
similarly unsuccessful.313 For example, in May 1919, the British seized a large
294 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 128-140 and accompanying text.
313. Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France and Italy Respecting Anatolia
(Treaty of Svres), Aug. 10, 1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 153 (Supp. 1921).
314. Cf id., arts. 226-228.
315. Id., art. 230.
316. James Brown Scott, Report on the Project of a Permanent Court of International Justice and
Resolutions of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, Sept. 17, 1920 [hereinafter 1920 Advisory
Committee Report], reprinted in 7 DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PAMPHLET No. 35, THE PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS 139 (photo. reprint 2000) (1920)
[hereinafter PROJECT OF PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE].
317. WILLIS, supra note 21, at 158.
318. UNWCC, supra note 122, at 45; Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 17.
319. See Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 281-317; see also BASS, supra note 159, at 106-46.
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number of detainees from a Turkish military prison and took them to Malta to
await trial by the Allies.3 14  Political conditions, however, soon changed
drastically. Domestically, the nationalist movement headed by Mustafa Kemal
was rapidly gaining strength.31 5 Internationally, the French and the Italians began
to secretly negotiate with Kemalists and thereby undermined British efforts to
bring the suspects to trial.316 Eventually, in October 1921, the British agreed to an
"all for all" exchange of its remaining Turkish prisoners for British hostages held
by the nationalists.
31 7
In addition, following the nationalists' recovery of Izmir and Kemal's bold
confrontation with the British,31 8 the victorious Turks were able to set the terms of
a peace. 319 Accordingly, on July 24, 1923, the Allies and Turkey signed the Treaty
of Lausanne.32 ° Unlike the earlier Treaty of S~vres, this treaty contained no war
crimes clauses; 321 furthermore, it was accompanied by a "Declaration of Amnesty"
322covering offenses committed during the wartime period. Such concessions were
also predicated upon the Allies' desire to ensure that Turkey, the master of the
Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, remained friendly to the western powers, as well
as upon their concomitant fear of the potential naval mobility of the nearby
Communist regime in Russia. 23
Instead, the Allies negotiated with Turkey to prosecute offenders, much as
they had done with Germany with the resulting Leipzig Trials. Ottoman
authorities eventually agreed to conduct domestic trials of those deemed
responsible for the Armenian massacres because they thought that by doing so
Turkey would be treated less severely at the Paris Peace Conference. 24 On
November 23, 1918, the Administration's Inquiry Commission (Inquiry
Commission) was established to investigate the misdeeds of Turkish officials.325
By January 1919, the Inquiry Commission had compiled 130 dossiers on
suspects. 3 26 On March 8, 1919, the Sultan authorized statutes for a new Court
Martial, which was charged with inquiring into the massacres. 27 The Key
Indictment that was issued was directed against the leaders of the Ittihad party.328
On July 5, 1919, a verdict was entered in which a number of ruling Ittihad
320. Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 285.
321. Id. at 286.
322. ld. at286,291.
323. Id. at 288-89.
324. See HANNS FROEMBGEN, KEMAL ATATURK: A BIOGRAPHY 186-97 (1937).
325. See WILLIS, supra note 21, at 162.
326. Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923 (Treaty of
Lausanne), reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. I (Supp. 1924).
327. See id.; UNWCC, supra note 122, at 45.
328. See Declaration of Amnesty and Protocol, July 24, 1923, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 92,
94 (Supp. 1924).
329. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 17.
330. Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 292.
331. Id. at 295.
332. Id. at 295.
333. id. at 296.
334. Id. at 298.
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members were condemned to death in absentia.3 29  The Courts Martial were,
however, abolished by January 1921, and numerous prosecutions were never
undertaken. 30
In sum, the Istanbul Trials, which were conducted between 1919 and early
1921, failed to secure justice for the slain Armenians. Like the later Leipzig Trials,
these proceedings before the Turkish Courts Martial were plagued by absent
defendants, light sentences, and a lack of popular support.331
The Turks, however, deny that events involving the Armenians during 1915-
1917 constituted crimes against humanity. They suggest that such claims were
wartime propaganda and point out that the Turks and the Armenians both died in
approximately the same proportion vis-&-vis the population size.332 Turkey denies
that there was a preconceived plan to exterminate the Armenians and attributes
their deaths, as well as the deaths of millions of Turks, to the famine, disease, and
breakdown in civil society that accompanied World War I:
There was no plan to destroy Armenians, but only the wartime necessity of
relocating them for the sake of military security. Those deported ... were
generally treated humanely and all necessary provisions were made for their
safety and well-being (though, admittedly this broke down at times). Some
Armenians were killed by criminals and roving tribes; others were killed as the
result of the civil war they were waging against Turkey within a global war.
33 3
Professor Dadrian, one of the foremost scholars on the Armenian genocide,
has, in the context of the post-war experience in Turkey, aptly summarized the
realpolitik of the Allies following the First World War:
As World War I ended, the Allies focused attention on punishment for the war
crimes committed against the Armenians. At first, the Allies attempted to apply
principles of international law to the perpetrators of the massacres. The initial
impulse to seek justice, however, faded in the months after the war and eventually
gave way to political expediency. The Turkish government's attempts to bring its
own nationals to justice also faltered. The rise of nationalism, and the Turkish
populace's increasingly defiant attitude toward the Allies, weakened the
government's resolve in its quest for justice. This weakened resolve and the
Allies' own waning interest sabotaged the efforts to punish those responsible for
the genocide.
334
335. Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 309.
336. Id.
337. See id. at 309-10, 312-14.
338. Roger W. Smith, Denial of the Armenian Genocide, in 2 GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEw 63, 67 (Israel W. Chamy ed., 1991).
339. Id. at 68.
340. Dadrian, Genocide, supra note 129, at 278.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Allies secured the inclusion of specific war crimes clauses in the
Treaty of Versailles, the treaty's two major penalty provisions, Articles 227 and
228, were never implemented. 3 5 This was due in no small part to the efforts of the
United States to limit the work of the Commission, whose substantive
recommendations were, for the most part, disregarded.336 As one of the American
delegates on the Commission later wrote, "I am bold enough to say that the
American commission rendered a service to the world at large in standing as a rock
against the trial of the kaiser for a legal offense . 337
It is important to note that the Treaty of Versailles began with the Covenant of
the League of Nations (Covenant).338  Article 14 of the Covenant provided, in
pertinent part:
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for
adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice.
The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an
international character which the parties thereto submit to it.
3 39
In light of this mandate, approximately one year after the signing of the
Versailles Treaty, an Advisory Committee of Jurists (Advisory Committee) was
assembled to formulate plans for the establishment of such a court. 4 ° On
September 17, 1920, Dr. James Brown Scott formally tendered the Committee's
Report on the Project of a Permanent Court of International Justice and
Resolutions of the Advisory Committee of Jurists (Committee Report).34' In a
veiled indictment of Allied realpolitik at the Paris Peace Conference, the
Committee Report referred to the following statement uttered by Baron Descamps,
the President of the Advisory Committee:
[T]he failure of the Conference at Paris to create such a tribunal, due to the
opposition of the American and Japanese representatives in the Commission on
Responsibilities, prevented the punishment of Emperor William II for the invasion
of Belgium and of the German officers for the crimes and violations of
341. Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 18.
342. See Bierzanek, supra note 103, at 92 ("The Allied Powers ultimately followed the
recommendations of the Commission only to a limited extent in drafting the Treaty of Versailles."); cf
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 68, at 18 ("The Treaty of Versailles did not link the
1919 Commission to eventual prosecutions recognized under its Articles 228 and 229, resulting in an
institutional vacuum between the investigation and prosecution stage.").
343. Scott, supra note 45, at 245.
344. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 95, at 48.
345. Id., Covenant, art. 14, at 52.
346. See 1920 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 310, reprinted in PROJECT OF PERMANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 310, at 2, 5.
347. Letter from James Brown Scott, Secretary and Director of the Division of International Law,
to Board of Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Sept. 17, 1920), reprinted in
PROJECT OF PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3 10, at 1.
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international law which they were alleged to have committed in the course of the
World War.
34 2
This weighty assessment accompanied the Advisory Committee's draft
proposal for a High Court of International Justice.343
On two separate occasions following "the war to end all wars" the Allies
failed to establish an international tribunal to try crimes committed by belligerents.
The Paris Peace Conference rejected the 1919 Commission's recommendation to
set up a High Tribunal to prosecute violations of both "the laws and customs of
war" and "the laws of humanity."'34 4 Likewise, the League of Nations ignored the
proposal of the Advisory Committee of Jurists to create a Permanent Court of
International Justice to try "crimes against international public order and the
universal law of nations. 345
Thus, apart from helping to lay the legal foundations for international criminal
justice in the future, the Allies' experiment in retributive justice following the First
World War was a dismal failure. Despite ample Allied resources, the availability
of the exhaustive investigative findings of the Commission, and an enemy prostrate
from war, hunger, and internal revolution, very few prosecutions were ever
undertaken, and of those that were, the sentences handed down were either
comparatively light or never fully executed. The value of justice had not
penetrated the practices of realpolitik.
It was only after being exposed to the total warfare of World War II that the
Allies finally began to travel down the road to justice that led to Nuremberg,346
Tokyo, and other Allied and national prosecutions, some of which persist to date.
As the time approached for the World War II Allies to pursue post-war
justice, the First World War precedent acquired more significance and even the
failures of the time served as a basis for what was to come. In time, the failures of
post-World War I justice were transformed into a partially valid precedent because
that was what was needed to justify the rising expectations of the international
society. And so it was also for the post-World War II precedent, whose
weaknesses were omitted in favor of the positive aspects that international society
wanted to buttress. History's revisionism, or selective memory, has its way of
348. 1920 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 310, reprinted in PROJECT OF PERMANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 310, at 139.
349. See id., reprinted in PROJECT OF PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note
310, at 139.
350. See supra notes 131-140 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 310-312 and accompanying text.
352. As a transition between the wartime massacres in Turkey and World War 11, reference is often
made to Adolph Hitler's purported rhetorical query, "Who after all is today speaking of the destruction
of the Armenians?" This statement, which is cited as evidence of genocidal intent on the part of the
Nazis, was allegedly uttered by Hitler at Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939 to his leading generals in
anticipation of the invasion of Poland. DADRIAN, HISTORY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE, supra note 138,
at 403. The document from which this remark is taken, however, was rejected by the Nuremberg
Tribunal as not being authentic. Id. at 47. Yet, the debate surrounding the statement continues to the
present day. See id. at 403-12.
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shaping the future even when it deforms the past. Niccol6 Machiavelli's adage is
confirmed - the ends justify the means.
347
353. See NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Peter Bondanella ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1984)
(1532).
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